A manpower comparison of three U.S. Navies the current fleet, a projected 313 ship fleet, and a more distributed bimodal alternative by Carrasco, Juan L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-09
A manpower comparison of three U.S. Navies the
current fleet, a projected 313 ship fleet, and a more
distributed bimodal alternative
Carrasco, Juan L.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
A MANPOWER COMPARISON OF THREE U. S. NAVIES: 
THE CURRENT FLEET, A PROJECTED 313 SHIP FLEET, 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Wayne Hughes 
   William Hatch 
 Second Reader: Daniel Nussbaum 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  A Manpower Comparison of Three U. S. Navies: The 
Current Fleet, a Projected 313 Ship Fleet, and a More Distributed Bimodal 
Alternative 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Juan L. Carrasco 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
A study conducted by the faculty at Naval Postgraduate School entitled “The New Navy Fighting Machine” 
(NNFM) proposes a new fleet design with 677 ships.  The study speculates that the manning would not be greatly 
different from the present Navy of 280 ships or the planned fleet of 313 ships.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
determine whether the study’s conjecture is true, by comparing the manpower requirements of the three fleets as 
rigorously as data and statistical methods will permit. 
Manpower estimates of existing ships, ships being designed and procured for the planned future Navy, and 
non-existent ships proposed for the NNFM were developed through various methodologies. 
A manpower baseline of 134,708 was calculated for the current ship inventory. Although the 313 Ship Navy 
has more ships, the manpower afloat decreased to 130,810.  The NNFM design required an even lower manpower 
number of 121,318 for even more ships.  Manpower is also more widely distributed.  Fifty-six percent of its total 
afloat manpower is designated to blue water missions, 21 percent are allocated to green water vessels, and 7 percent 
to the submarine force.  This long-term manpower information can provide valuable insight for future U.S. Navy fleet 
composition, size, requirements, and limitations. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
136 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Manpower, Crew Size, Manning, 313 Ship Navy, New Navy Fighting 
Machine, NNFM, Requirements  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
A MANPOWER COMPARISON OF THREE U. S. NAVIES: 
THE CURRENT FLEET, A PROJECTED 313 SHIP FLEET, AND A MORE 
DISTRIBUTED BIMODAL ALTERNATIVE 
 
 
Juan L. Carrasco 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Jacksonville University, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 


























Robert F. Dell 
Chairman, Department of Operations Research 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
A study conducted by the faculty at Naval Postgraduate School entitled “The New 
Navy Fighting Machine” (NNFM) proposes a new fleet design with 677 ships.  The study 
speculates that the manning would not be greatly different from the present Navy of 280 
ships or the planned fleet of 313 ships.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether 
the study’s conjecture is true, by comparing the manpower requirements of the three 
fleets as rigorously as data and statistical methods will permit. 
Manpower estimates of existing ships, ships being designed and procured for the 
planned future Navy, and non-existent ships proposed for the NNFM were developed 
through various methodologies. 
A manpower baseline of 134,708 was calculated for the current ship inventory. 
Although the 313 Ship Navy has more ships, the manpower afloat decreased to 130,810.  
The NNFM design required an even lower manpower number of 121,318 for even more 
ships.  Manpower is also more widely distributed.  Fifty-six percent of its total afloat 
manpower is designated to blue water missions, 21 percent are allocated to green water 
vessels, and 7 percent to the submarine force.  This long-term manpower information can 
provide valuable insight for future U.S. Navy fleet composition, size, requirements, and 
limitations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A study conducted by the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) entitled 
“The New Navy Fighting Machine” was published in August 20091.  It propounds an 
affordable new fleet design with significantly more ships than at present, including many 
vessels suited for widely distributed offshore patrol and coastal combat operations.  The 
study speculates that the manning its many more vessels would not be greatly different 
from the present Navy of 280 ships or the planned fleet of 313 ships.  The NPS study 
expects that the manning numbers would be similar because there are fewer large, 
multipurpose ships and many smaller and less costly vessels designed for more focused 
missions and tasks. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the study’s conjecture is true, 
by comparing the manning of the three fleets as rigorously as data and statistical methods 
will permit.  The comparison includes uniformed personnel in ships’ companies and air 
crews and civilian seamen in the non-combatants, but not Marines or staffs that might be 
embarked.  It includes afloat personnel in support ships, but not the manpower for 
support or training ashore at either overseas or domestic sites, in either temporary or 
permanent installations. 
The methodology, described in detail in Chapter I, determines the manning of 
existing ships, ships being designed and procured for the planned future Navy, and non-
existent ships proposed for the “new navy fighting machine” (NNFM).  The analysis 
itself is described in detail in the succeeding chapters and appendices. 
Crew size estimates for the NNFM ships were particularly challenging.  Because 
many of the ships proposed do not exist in the U. S. Navy, there were no examples in 
which to develop a crew size.  The assumption that displacement is an adequate proxy for 
estimating capability and crew size was tested and shown to be statistically sound.  In 
general, the larger the combatant and the greater its capabilities, the more manpower is 
                                                 
1 “The New Navy Fighting Machine:  A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, 
Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet,” Wayne P. 
Hughes, Jr., CAPT, USN (Ret.), Principal Investigator, August 2009. 
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required2.  To show the relationship, a sample of 149 U. S. and foreign ships was 
developed.  We show that a strong correlation exists between crew size and ship tonnage, 
as can be seen in the figure below.   
Crew Size as a Function of Ship Displacement
n=149 or n=145
y = 0.0319x + 10.691
R2 = 0.9543
























(w /o US CVN)
 
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement on Warships 












Current Ship Inventory 280 3953 34930 95825 134708 
313 Ship Navy 313 5272 41158 84380 130810 
New Navy Fighting 
Machine 677 7101 25954 88263 121318 
Summary of Manpower Estimates 
The resultant 134,708 total manpower baseline for the current ship inventory is 
sound.  For example, the total military afloat manpower requirement was calculated at 
130,810.  This estimate is approximately 11% higher than the average afloat USN and 
USMC personnel onboard from 2005 to 2009, the period that the U.S. Navy has 
fluctuated around 280 warships.  This is well within the “readiness gaps” normally  
 
                                                 
2 This assumption is only applied to warships.  Logistics supply ships do not exhibit the same 
displacement/crew relationship. 
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incurred by the difference in declared manpower requirements and current-onboard 
numbers.  Of particular interest is that the 11 aircraft carriers (4% of the Navy’s 
warships) constitute 46.5% of the manpower afloat. 
Although the 313 Ship Navy has more ships (an increase of approximately 12%) 
the manpower afloat decreased to 130,810 (a decrease of nearly 3%).  This reduction is 
credible if current technological advances and optimal manning initiatives successfully 
shape future crew sizes as proposed.  The fleet is still blue water-centric with nearly 58% 
of the manpower afloat aboard aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. 
The result of the NNFM design is an even lower manpower requirement of 
121,318 (a reduction of 7% over the 313 Ship Navy and nearly 10% less than the Current 
Fleet Inventory) for even more ships (116% more ships than 313 and 141% more than the 
current inventory).  Manpower seems more widely distributed throughout the Navy’s 
missions.  There is still a large percent of manpower (43%) aboard aircraft carriers, 
although there are now 24 of them.  Sixteen of the carriers with only 34% of the 
manpower afloat are allocated for blue water operations.  The total number of manpower 
required aboard the 165 blue water ships decreased slightly to 56%.  The remaining eight 
light carriers are allotted to the green water mission.  With a total of 248 ships and 400 
inshore patrol craft, the green water manpower personnel increased dramatically, from 
1.2% in the current inventory and 3% in the 313 Ship Navy design, to 21% in the NNFM. 
This information can provide valuable insight for future U.S. Navy fleet 
composition, size, requirements, and limitations.  Estimations on recruiting numbers, 
training resources, retention rates, and overall personnel costs can be made from the long-
term manpower projections developed in this work.   
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1. Fleet Size 
Change in the size and composition of the U.S. Navy fleet is inevitable.  During 
the Reagan era, 1980 to 1988, the Navy increased from 480 warships to a maximum of 
594 in 1987.  Shipbuilding plans were to have “14 deployable carrier battle groups…and 
a total of 582 deployable ships” (“Manpower for a 600-Ship Navy: Costs and Policy 
Alternatives,” 1983, p. 1) by 1988.  To meet the continuing Cold War threat, long term 
goals of the administration were to have 15 carrier battle groups and a total of 610 
warships.  Ship numbers began to fall in 1990 after the end of the Cold War and 
continued to decline for the next 18 years to the current inventory of 2803 ships.  Warship 
numbers in Figure 1 are were taken from The Naval History and Heritage Command 
website.  More data is provided in Appendix B. 




















Figure 1.   U.S. Navy Ship Levels  
                                                 
3 There were 280 ships at the time of this study.  Ship numbers have fluctuated between 279 and 283 
for the last several years, as some ships are retired and others are commissioned.  
 2
A shipbuilding plan to reach 313 ships by 2035 was proposed in 2005.  The plan 
retains the carrier strike group as the dominant naval force structure.  With 11/12 aircraft 
carriers, this arrangement appears to be a power projection-heavy fleet “optimized to 
pound land targets with aviation and guided missile strikes.”  (Work, 2006, p. 10)  Many 
critics say that the proposed 313 Ship Navy cannot be afforded in today’s current 
economic climate.  “Indeed, CBO projects that average shipbuilding costs between FYs 
07 and 35 may approach $20 billion annually.” (Work, 2006, p. 4)  This is well above the 
estimated $13.4 billion baseline shipbuilding budget.  Others observe that it is too heavy 
in power projection, a residual of the Cold War Navy that was meant to confront the 
Soviets.  The plan “exemplifies the Defense Department's fixation on preserving legacy 
systems designed for a kind of war that the U.S. is likely never to fight again.” (Arquilla, 
2008)  Now, small irregular wars and China dominate our national strategy. 
Professor Hughes and others have presented their ideas of a “New Navy Fighting 
Machine4” (NNFM) which proposes alternative ship designs believed to be consistent 
with national goals, and a maritime strategy to accommodate the goals, threats, and 
responses indicated for the Twenty-first Century. (Hughes, 2009, p 1)  It attempts to do 
this within the $13.4 billion budget proposed for the 313 Ship Navy5.  The NNFM offers 
a “wider mix of ships in a more numerous fleet with better focused capabilities” (Hughes, 
2009, p. vii) to meet a range of traditional “blue water” scenarios as well as asymmetric, 
unconventional threats often times found in the littorals and “green water.”  With smaller, 
less expensive, and more distributable ships, the NNFM may better respond to small and 
“hybrid” wars while simultaneously freeing the high end warships for more demanding 
operations.  A count of 677 ships and an additional 400 small inshore patrol craft is put 
forward. 
                                                 
4 “The New Navy Fighting Machine:  A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, 
Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet,” Wayne P. 
Hughes, Jr., CAPT, USN (Ret.), Principal Investigator, August 2009. 
5 FY05$ 13.4 billion adjusts to FY09$ 14.7 billion after a 1.1005 inflation factor is applied.  The 
NNFM study projects a $15.0 billion per year SCN budget, with 10%, or $1.5 billion set aside for strategic 
deterrence. 
 3
The idea of an alternative fleet design with smaller more numerous warships 
better suited to face the Navy’s current strategic vision of engagement in littorals is not 
unique.  In an April 2009 speech at the U.S. Naval War College, Defense Secretary 
Robert M. Gates said: 
You don't necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of 
teenaged pirates…To carry out the missions we may face in the future—
whether dealing with non-state actors at sea or near shore, or swarming 
speedboats—we will need numbers, speed and ability to operate in 
shallow waters.6  
2. Manpower Concerns 
A discussion of manpower requirements is conspicuously absent from both plans.  
As a Navy Human Resources Officer, the author understands that an accurate assessment 
of manpower needs is critical to the fleet. (Moore et al., 2002, p. 1)  If the manpower 
number is too low, ships’ capability and performance suffer, ultimately resulting in 
reduction of overall Navy readiness.  However, “The cost of a ship's crew is the single 
largest incurred over the ship's life cycle.” (GAO–03–520, 2003, p. 1)  Funds that could 
be used for other vital programs are wasted if the manpower numbers are too high.  


















Figure 2.   U.S. Afloat Personnel Levels  
                                                 
6 Secretary Gates’ quote is taken from the article “Fleets Turn to Small Ships for New Conflicts,” Paul 
McLeary, Aviation Week Defense Technology International, June 30, 2009  
 4
Figure 2 above provides the numbers USN and USMC personnel afloat since 
1980.  Active Duty personnel numbers were taken from DoD PERSONNEL & 
PROCUREMENT STATISTICS files.  The numbers generally follow the number of 
warships ships in the fleet.  The normalized data in Figure 3 more clearly shows this 
trend for nearly the last three decades.  Generally speaking, “A larger fleet will require 
more manpower.” (“Manpower for a 600-Ship Navy: Costs and Policy Alternatives,” 
1983, p. 1)  This should be a real concern if the Navy plans to increase its number of 
ships, as personnel costs continue to escalate.   






































Figure 3.   Normalized Ship and Personnel Levels 
If the historic trend line for the number of ships vs. afloat personnel shown in 
Figure 4 holds into the future, then the personnel required for 313 ships would be 
approximately 137,000 and 677 ships would require approximately 284,0007. (Current 
USN and USMC personnel afloat is at 105,480, an all-time low for the last 20 years)  Not 
only does it appear that the 313 Ship Navy will not remain within its budget, it may prove 
to be even more expensive if the number of personnel must also rise with the increased 
number of ships.  With 677 ships, any budgetary advantage gained by the NNFM with 
smaller, less expensive ships may be lost due to the additional manpower required to 
operate the more numerous ships. 
                                                 
7 402.95 * 313 + 11039 = 137162, 402.95 * 677 + 11039 = 283836. 
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Figure 4.   Afloat Personnel versus Number of Ships 
This research will examine the afloat manpower numbers of the current U.S. 
Navy Fleet of 280 ships and then develop projected manpower requirements for both the 
313 Ship Fleet serving as the Navy’s target force and the proposed bimodal NNFM.  The 
manpower requirements include uniformed personnel in the ship’s company, uniformed 
aviation personnel, and civilian seamen in the Military Sealift Command (MSC).  Only 
afloat personnel were examined.   
The Navy is a closed personnel system; that is, nearly all of its personnel enter as 
raw recruits and gain experience while in the service.  The Navy must have a plan to 
recruit, house, train, and develop personnel well in advance to ensure that it will have the 
required mix of experience when needed.  Estimations on recruiting numbers, training 
resources, retention rates, and overall personnel costs can be made from the long-term 
manpower projections developed in this work.  This information can provide valuable 
insight for future U.S. Navy fleet composition, size, requirements, and limitations.  
We will learn in this study that the straight-line projection based solely on the 
number of ships in the fleet can be very misleading.  The composition of the fleet, from 
small single-mission vessels to large multi-mission capital ships, greatly affects overall 
manpower requirements.  Technology and manpower reduction initiatives likewise affect 
final numbers.  Manpower estimates entail a more thorough and detailed process.  This 
study is but one approach to estimating these requirements. 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
A. DATA 
Initially crew data was to be gathered primarily using U.S. Navy Ship Manpower 
Documents (SMD).  SMDs provide the most current manpower requirements for each 
class of USN warship.  A requirement is “the minimum number of people required to 
accomplish 100% of a mission.”  However, there are many “X” class ships in the 313 
Ship Navy, and the majority of NNFM ships simply do not exist in the current USN fleet.  
SMDs for these proposed classes of ships, therefore, do not exist.  Foreign ships of 
particular sizes and similar capabilities would need to be considered in the development 
of crew size estimates.  A single source of ship type, country, class, displacement, crew 
size, aircrew, and approximate number of aircraft data was desired for consistent 
comparisons. 
Ship data was therefore extracted from Jane’s Fighting Ships (JFS) whenever 
possible (http://jfs.janes.com/public/jfs/index.shtml).  Although JFS data collection 
methodology is not transparent to the user, it appears to be based on ship manpower 
requirements, as reported to it by each country’s Navy.  Whatever the source, it is 
assumed that the JFS methodology is relatively consistent across ship types and that 
errors in numbers are likewise consistent. 
There were a few occasions for USN ships when JFS data was out of date and 
more current data was significantly different.  For example, Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers had two phases, Flight I and Flight II.  JFS provided data of 346 (FLI) and 352 
(FLII) based on the initial crew sizes.  The SMD provided more current numbers of 271, 
276, or 278, depending on flight.  Such differences were significant enough to warrant 
consideration.  On these occasions SMD were used to supplement the JFS data.  
Differences are explained where applicable. 
A total sample of 149 ship classes was collected and is provided in Appendix C. 
 8
B. METHOD FOR DETERMINING CREW SIZES 
Different methodologies were used to determine crew sizes, depending on which 
fleet architecture was being analyzed.  In general, crew size refers to the ships crew 
which is required to operate the ship.  Aircrew numbers consist of pilots and maintenance 
crew in the aviation detachment.  Flag staff personnel and Marine military lift troops 
have not been included in this study.  Detailed explanations of crew size estimates are 
provided in each section of the analysis. 
Technology tends to reduce the manpower needs as is reflected in the RAND 
graph shown in Figure 5.  Efforts will be made to capture reductions in manpower 
resulting from improved technology and the implementation of Optimum Manning (OM) 
initiatives.  Other assumptions and limitations are discussed in each applicable section. 
 
  
Figure 5.   Technology Effects on Manpower Needs (From Schank et al., 2005, p. 71)  
1. Current Inventory 
Crew size data for ships in the current inventory are easily available.  Although 
SMD crew data for current USN warships could have been used, it was determined that 
comparisons with foreign ships would be required to develop manpower estimates for 
many of the ships in the 313 Ship and NNFM fleets.  Ship data from JFS would provide a 
consistent source.  Aircrew sizes for some ships were estimated by examining analogous 
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ships with similar aircraft capabilities.  Reductions in manpower through implementation 
of OM initiatives were captured by supplementing SMD data when JFS data was 
significantly out-dated.  Any differences are discussed in their respective sections. 
2. 313 Ship Navy 
Ship and crew size data was extracted from JFS whenever possible.  However, 
many ships in the 313 Ship Navy are proposed “X” class ships.  Documentation exists 
from a variety of sources on their projected ship capabilities, size, armament, etc.  Getting 
consistent data on crew sizes, however, was difficult.  Current USN warships were used 
as analogies.  Ship builder web pages, PEO briefs, reports to Congress, and other 
presentations provided the bulk of context for these proposed ships.  Historical numbers 
and trends were used when possible to help develop crew estimates for new (“X” class) 
ships. 
3. New Navy Fighting Machine 
The majority of analysis was done in this section.  Because most ships in the 
NNFM do not exist, there is no JFS data available.  Because many of them are novel 
concepts for the current U.S. Navy, there were no specific U.S. ships to use as direct 
analogies.  When the development of crew size estimates was required, an assumption 
was made that displacement of warships is an adequate proxy for capability and, by 
extension, could be used as a basis for estimating crew size.  For example, the larger a 
ship is, the greater the capability, and therefore, more manpower required to operate it.  
Further discussion on the assumption crew sizes as a function of displacement is provided 
in the following section.  By performing regressions on foreign and USN ships of similar 
size and capability, potential crew sizes could be estimated.  Standard regression statistics 
were applied to determining if the postulated relationship between ship tonnage and ship 
crew size indeed existed.  In general, a significance of F of less than 10% and an adjusted 
R2 value of greater than 80% is desired8.  With a crew size relationship determined, crew 
size estimates could be developed once ship displacement was determined. 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A for a brief description of adjusted R2, significance of F, and other statistics terms. 
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C. DISPLACEMENT AS A PROXY FOR CAPABILITY 
This work uses a supposition that the size of a warship, specifically its tonnage, is 
indicative of the crew size required to operate it.  The assumption employs a ship’s 
displacement as a proxy for its capability, and by extension, the manpower required to 
operate it.  If the assumption is valid, then crew sizes of proposed ships can be predicted 
by utilizing an estimated ship displacement based on ship size and desired capabilities.  
The sample collected from JFS of 149 USN and Foreign warships in Appendix C 
was examined.  There is a strong correlation of 0.9769 between displacement and crew 
size, indicating that as one increases, so does the other.  A regression was performed with 
a resulting equation of: y = 0.0319 * x +10.691, where y is the estimated crew size and x 
is the ship displacement in tons.  The trend line is shown in Figure 6.  The significance of 
F is 2.1750E–100, signifying that regression equation is better than the mean of the data.  
The adjusted R2 value is high at 0.9540, signifying that nearly all of the variation of the 
data is explained by the regression model.   
There were several outliers that caused some concern.  The four U.S. Carriers in 
particular may be acting as influencers to the regression.  If these data points are omitted, 
the regression produces an equation of y = 0.029 * x+ 21.384, predicting estimates very 
similar to the first model.  The F-score significance is 6.9981E–69 and the adjusted R2 
value is 0.8836, suggesting that this is an acceptable model as well.  Even better 
statistical results are obtained if all eight outliers are omitted from the regression. 
From the statistics it can be determined that the regression is a good model of the 
data and that there is in fact a relationship between a ship’s displacement and its crew 
size.  Additional regression statistics are available in Appendix D. 
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Crew Size as a Function of Ship Displacement
n=149 or n=145
y = 0.0319x + 10.691
R2 = 0.9543
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Figure 6.   Warship Crew Sizes as a Function of Tonnage 
Because different ship types are sure to have different relationships with respect 
to crew size, separate regressions were conducted on ships of similar type and size – 
approximately 10 in all.  Neither the MSC combat logistics support ships nor the MPF(F) 
ships exhibit the same displacement/crew relationship that warships demonstrate9.  Crew 
size estimations for these ships were performed separately, using MSC web page data and 
MPF(F) presentations.  Explanations are given in their respective sections. 
D. MANPOWER TERMINOLOGY 
This work estimates Manpower Requirements that are necessary to operate a ship 
or air wing detachment.  The manpower data provided in JFS is assumed to be the 
Manpower Requirements as reported by each country’s navy.  The U.S. Navy’s wartime 
requirements are set in Ship and Squadron Manpower Documents (SMD/SQMD).  These 
documents record Fleet requirements for minimum number of people required to 
accomplish 100% of a wartime mission.  The Billets Authorized are those billets 
approved by the CNO for the current operating conditions, typically some amount less 
than the determined requirements.  This number is tied to the End Strength set by 
Congress and has typically been 90% of the determined Manpower Requirements.  The 
Personnel Assigned are all the officers and enlisted personnel attached to that ship or 
                                                 
9 Regression produced an adjusted R2 value of 0.0319.  See Appendix F for additional regression 
statistics. 
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squadron, usually less than the Billets Authorized.  Finally, the Current-Onboard numbers 
are the actual personnel onboard ready for operations.  This number is usually less than 
the Personnel Assigned due to training, illness, transfers, holdees, etc.  The difference 
between The Manpower Requirements and the Current-Onboard is called the “Personnel 
Readiness Gap,” illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.   Personnel Readiness Gap (from 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~kishore/mpt/mpt.overall.process.htm) 
The following definitions were taken from OPNAVINST 1000.16K: Navy Total 
Force Manpower Policies Procedure: 
ACTIVE DUTY (ACDU): Full-time duty in the military service of the U. S. (other than 
active duty for training purposes) 
 
ACTIVITY (ACTY): A unit, organization or installation performing a specific mission or 
function and established under a commanding officer, officer in charge, etc. (e.g., Naval 
Air Station, Naval Shipyard, Naval Station, a specific air squadron, ship, etc.). 
 
AUTHORIZATION (AUTH): A billet for which funding has been provided (manpower 
space) and for which the quality has been authorized by CNO as a requirement to 
perform the billet functions. 
 
END STRENGTH: The number of officer and enlisted requirements that can be 
authorized (funding) based on approved budgets.  End strength is set forth for each 
activity in the FYDP. 
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MANNING: The specific inventory of personnel at an activity, in terms of numbers, 
grades, and occupational groups. 
 
MANPOWER MANAGEMENT: The methodical process of determining, validating, and 
using manpower requirements as a basis for budget decisions; determining manpower 
authorization priorities based on available funding and personnel inventory; and the 
ability to link all these factors together. 
 
MANPOWER REQUIREMENT: The minimum quantitative and qualitative resource 
needed to perform a specific mission, function, or task.   
 
MANPOWER RESOURCES: Human resources available that can be applied against 
manpower requirements. 
 
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED: A tabulation of all officer and enlisted personnel charged to 
an activity. 
 
REQUIREMENT: A specific manpower space that is assigned qualifiers that define the 
duties, tasks, and functions to be performed and the specific skills and skill level required 
to perform the delineated functions.  Also referred to as “BILLET.” 
 
SHIP MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SMD): Quantitative and qualitative manpower 
requirements for an individual ship or class of ships and the rational for determination of 
the requirements.  Requirements are predicated upon a ROC/POE, ship configuration, 
specified operating profile, computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints 
such as standard workweeks, leave policy, etc. 
 
SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SQMD): Quantitative and qualitative 
manpower requirements for an individual aviation squadron or a class of squadrons and 
the rationale for the determination of the manpower requirements. Manpower 
requirements are predicated upon statements of ROC/POE, aircraft configuration, 
specified operating profile, computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints. 
 
SUPPORT MANPOWER: Shore manpower associated with shore activities. Support 
manpower is all manpower associated with units included in categories not included in 
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III. ANALYSIS  
A. CURRENT INVENTORY BASELINE 
The U.S. Navy currently has 280 battle force ships consisting of 11 aircraft 
carriers, 22 cruisers, 52 destroyers, 30 frigates, 1 littoral combat ships, 14 mine warfare 
ships, 8 patrol craft, 53 attack submarines, 14 strategic ballistic missile submarines; 4 
guided missile submarines, 32 amphibious ships, and 39 combat logistics support ships.   
Most ship crew sizes in this research were determined using Jane’s Fighting Ships 
(JFS) whenever possible (http://jfs.janes.com/public/jfs/index.shtml).  U.S. Navy Ship 
Manpower Documents (SMD) were used on occasion when JFS data was out of date and 
more current data was significantly different.  Differences are explained where 
applicable. 
The U.S. Navy first reached 282 ships in 2005 with 130,026 USN and USMC 
personnel afloat. (“DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional area and 
by Country,” 2005)  It has since fluctuated between 279 and 283 for several years with an 
average of 117,240 active duty personnel afloat.  There has been some observable 
pressure to reduce personnel numbers in the last two years (as was observed previously in 
Table 3).  With 283 ships in 2009, there is one more ship than in 2005, but nearly 25,000 
less personnel.  It is unclear whether this reduction is due to transient current-onboard 
numbers, relatively temporary changes in Billet Authorizations as directed annually by 
Congress, or more permanent reductions due to changes in manpower requirements10.  
Because the numbers available change throughout the year, it is assumed to be current-
onboard data. 
The resultant baseline for total manpower afloat, including Active Duty ship’s 
crew and aircrew and civilian crew is estimated at 134,708.  This estimate for the current 
ship inventory is sound.  For example, the total military afloat manpower requirement 
was calculated at approximately 130,800.  This estimate is approximately 11% higher 
                                                 
10 See the Manpower Terminology section for a brief discussion on this. 
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than the average afloat USN and USMC personnel onboard from 2005 to 2009.  This is 
well within the “readiness gaps” normally incurred by the differences in declared 
manpower requirements and current-onboard numbers.  “Currently, the U.S. Navy 
‘authorises’ ship manpower at approximately 90 percent of the requirement.” (J. F. 
Schank et. al., p. 75) 
Table 5 on page 28 summarizes the final numbers based on the discussions below. 
1. Aircraft Carriers 
Particular attention is given to CVN manpower because these ships take about 
47% of the total personnel afloat.  Only 11 aircraft carriers remain after the 
decommissioning of USS John F. Kennedy in 2007—1 CVN 65 and 10 CVN 68 class 
ships.  Both classes have similar capability for carrying a mix of approximately 52 
aircraft.  The JFS aircrew estimate will be used in the model. 
a. CVN 65 Aircraft Carrier 
JFS states a ship’s crew size of 3350.  This is significantly different from 
the 3524 listed in Part II of the CVN 65 SMD.  It should also be noted, however, that this 
number differs from the actual count of 3627 billets in Part III of the SMD.  Although the 
SMD number may be more accurate, the JFS number will be used as the estimate for 
consistency when comparing crew sizes to foreign ships.  The JFS aircrew estimate 2480 
will be used for CVN 65. 
b. CVN 68 Aircraft Carrier 
There is also a discrepancy between JFS and CVN 68 SMD numbers, 
3200 and 3332 respectively.  Again, it should be noted that this also differs from the 
actual count of 3465 billets in Part III.  The JFS number will again be used as the 
estimate for consistency.  The JFS aircrew estimate 2480 will again be used for CVN 68. 
 17
2. Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates 
Cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are large, heavily armed, multi-mission surface 
combatants.  They carry out a wide range of missions from surface and anti-submarine 
warfare to operations against enemy aircraft and land targets.  There are 22 cruisers, 52 
destroyers and 30 frigates.  They all have the capability to carry helicopters ,and 
therefore, aircrew must be added to the overall manpower number.  Any aviation 
maintenance detachment personnel are assumed to be incorporated within the ship’s crew 
and aircrew totals.  See Section 7 below for a discussion of aircrew. 
a. CG 47 Cruiser 
JFS lists a crew size of 358.  However, Ticonderoga class cruisers are to 
undergo SmartShip modernization, which is a program to apply technology to reduce 
workload and manpower requirements.  According to JFS, modernization began in 2006 
and is to be completed on all Ticonderoga class ships by 2017.  Other initiatives have 
also reduced manpower requirements.  It is important to capture effects of optimal 
manning initiatives on future ships.  For this reason, SMD data will be used vice JFS to 
develop a crew size estimate for cruisers.  CG 47 SMD lists crew size without SmartShip 
at 339.  Crew size for CG 47 with SmartShip is listed as 326 (a difference of 13 billets).  
An average of crew size with and without SmartShip (333) will be used to estimate 
current cruiser manpower.  Ticonderoga class cruisers carry two SH-60B Seahawk 
LAMPS III helicopters.  An aircrew estimate of 19 requirements will be included; see 
section 7 below for further detail. 
SmartShip reduction in cruiser manpower will be used later as a baseline 
to derive CG (X) manpower numbers for the 313 Ship Navy. 
b. DDG 51 Destroyer 
The Arleigh Burke destroyer class had two phases, Flight I and Flight II.  
JFS provided crew size of 346 for Flight I and 352 for Flight II based the initial crew 
data.  The DDG 51 SMD provides more current numbers of 271, 276, or 278, depending 
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on flight, after modernization and manpower reduction initiatives.  A weighted average11, 
of manpower requirements was taken to develop the crew size estimate of 274 for current 
destroyers. 
52%*271 (DDG 51–78) + 11.5%*278 (DDG 79–84) + 35.5%*276 (DDG 85–104) 
DDG 51 class destroyers have the capacity for two SH-60 Seahawk 
helicopters but usually only carry one.  An aircrew estimate of 10 will be included.  See 
Section 7 below for further detail on aircrew estimation. 
Similar to the cruisers above, it is important to reflect manpower reduction 
and adjustment effects on crew size to forecast future requirements.  These will be 
captured by using the most current destroyer data of 276 (DDG 85–90 Flight II SMD) as 
the baseline for future DDG(X) manpower numbers. 
c. FFG 7 Frigate 
Ship’s crew of 200 and air crew of 19 were taken directly from JFS.  FFG 
7 SMD states a ship’s crew of 205. 
3. Littoral Vessels 
Littoral vessels provide theater security for ports and shore areas.  There are 
currently one littoral combat ship, 14 mine warfare ships and 8 patrol craft that operate in 
littoral environments. 
a. LCS 1 Littoral Combat Ship 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is still a new program, consisting of two 
variants, so there are some discrepancies on the final number of LCS crew.  JFS states a 
crew size of 50 for LCS 1 class ships and a crew size of 40 for LCS 2 class ships.  These 
numbers are both supported by available literature.  A proceedings presentation in May05 
(Etnyre, 2005) states a crew of 40 while the LCS Flight 0 Pre ACAT (“Littoral Combat  
                                                 
11 Weighted by number of ships in each flight phase in the current inventory. 
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Ship Flight 0,” 2003, p. 4) states threshold level of 50 core crew members.  An average 
estimate of 45 billets for LCS is used.  LCS carries 2 MH-60 or 1 MH-60 and 3 UAV’s; 
an aircrew of 19 will be included. 
b. MCM 1 Mine Sweeper 
Ship’s crew of 84 was taken directly from JFS.  MCM 1 SMD states a 
ship’s crew of 87. 
c. PC 1 Patrol Craft 
Ship’s crew of 39 was taken directly from JFS.  This study did not include 
the 9 SEALs or law enforcement detachment that could be deployed.  PC 1 SMD states a 
ship’s crew of 28. 
4. Submarines 
All U.S. submarines are nuclear powered.  There are 53 fast attack submarines, 14 
strategic missile submarines, and four cruise missile submarines.  Attack submarines are 
multi-mission, conducting surveillance and special operations and well as tradition roles 
of surface and anti-submarine warfare.  Cruise missile submarines also conduct 
surveillance and special operations as well as having a tremendous strike capability.  
Strategic missile submarines typically have a single mission: strategic deterrence.   
a. SSN 688 Fast Attack Submarine (Los Angeles) 
Ship’s crew of 134 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 688 SMD states a 
ship’s crew of 149.  This is a large difference for the size of the crew.  It is unclear what 
causes the difference between the two documents.  The JFS number will be used as the 
estimate to be consistent when comparing crew sizes to foreign ships. 
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b. SSN 21 Fast Attack Submarine (Seawolf) 
There is again a relatively large difference between JFS data and SSN 21 
SMD data; crew sizes of 140 and 151 respectively.  Again JFS numbers will be used to 
provide consistency across foreign classes. 
c. SSN 774 Fast Attack Submarine (Virginia) 
Ship’s crew of 134 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 774 SMD data was 
not available at the time of this study. 
d. SSBN 730 Strategic Missile Submarines 
Ship’s crew of 155 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 730 SMD states a 
ship’s crew of 159. 
e. SSGN 726 Cruise Missile Submarines 
Ship’s crew of 155 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 726 SMD data was 
not available at the time of this study.  It is assumed that crew size and structure would be 
closely analogous to the SSBN crew. 
f. AS 39 Sub Tenders 
Ship’s crew of 1268 was taken directly from JFS. 
5. Amphibious Ships 
Amphibious ships support Marine Corps operations from the sea.  “They must be 
able to sail in harm’s way and provide a rapid buildup of combat power ashore in the face 
of opposition.”  (“Amphibious Assault Ships—LHA/LHD/LHA(R),” 2009)  Amphibious 
ships often have large decks and have the capability to carry helicopters.  Two classes 
have flight decks that can also launch and receive airplanes.  Aircrew must be added to 
the overall manpower number.  As before, any aviation maintenance detachment 
personnel are assumed to be incorporated into the ship’s crew and aircrew totals.  See 
Section 7 below for a discussion of aircrew. 
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a. LHA 1 Tarawa Class Amphibious Assault Ship 
There is a large discrepancy for crew size between JFS and LHA 1 SMD 
data.  JFS lists 964 while SMD lists 1230.  Table 1 lists the specifications of the 
preceding and succeeding classes of ships, and normalizes the crew size to ship 
displacement.   
 
 Year Ship Class Tons Crew Crew/Tons ln(#) ln(ratio)
1 1961 Iwo Jima Class 18,474 667 0.0361 0 -3.321 
2 1976 Tarawa Class(SMD) 39,967 1230 0.0308 0.693 -3.481 
2 1976 Tarawa Class(JFS) 39,967 964 0.0241 0.693 -3.724 
3 1989 Wasp Class 40,650 1123 0.0276 1.098 -3.589 
4 2009 Makin Island 41,661 1123 0.0270 1.386 -3.613 
5 2012 America Class 44,850 1059 0.0236 1.609 -3.746 
Table 1.   Crew Size Normalized to Ship Displacement 
By examining the normalized data, a “learning curve” with respect to crew 
size over ship successions can be seen, y = 0.0363 * x-0.2453, as shown in Figure 8.  The 
learning curve has a slope of approximately 84%. 
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Figure 8.   Crew Size Learning Curve for Amphibious Assault Ships 
A logarithmic transformation of the data was done to perform a linear 
regression of the model and obtain statistical analysis.  The resulting trend line shown in 
 22
Figure 9 is y = -0.2453 * x – 3.3164.  The F-score significance is 0.0164 and the adjusted 
R2 is 0.9513.  Additional regression statistics can be found in Appendix D.   
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Figure 9.   Logarithmic Transformation of Crew Size 
 
When the JFS data is included, the statistics of the regression worsen, with 
an F-score significance of 0.1246 and an adjusted R2 value of 0.4651.  On the other hand, 
when the SMD data is used, the statistics improve with an F-score significance of 0.0023 
and an adjusted R2 of 0.9590.  The LHA 1 SMD data fits the curve better and so will be 
used as the estimate for crew size for of this class.  Learning curves such as this will 
become important when predicting crew sizes of future amphibious assault ships.  
Tarawa class amphibious assault ships can carry nine CH-53D Sea 
Stallion, or twelve CH-46D/E Sea Knight helicopters, or any mix of these.  An estimate 
of 263 will be used to model aircrew for this class.   
This study does not consider the 1700 marines of the military lift 
detachment.   
b. LHD 1 Wasp Class Amphibious Assault Ship 
Ship’s crew of 1123 was taken directly from JFS.  LHD 1 SMD states a 
ship’s crew of 1075.  “A typical complement of aircraft is a mix of 25 helicopters and six 
to eight Harriers (AV-8B). In the secondary role as a sea control ship the most likely mix 
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is 20 AV-8B Harriers and four to six SH-60B Seahawk helicopters.”  (Jane’s Fighting 
Ships, 2009)  An estimate of 511 aircrew requirements will be used.  See Section 7 below 
for further discussion on aircrew estimates.  This study does not consider the 1690 
marines of the military lift detachment. 
c. LCC 19 Amphibious Command Ship 
JFS data provides crew size of 786.  This is likely initial crew size as of 
1970 commissioning date.  LCC 19 SMD lists a crew size of 600 after several rounds of 
crew decreases.  The lower number of 600 will be used to estimate LCC 19 crew size to 
help capture crew reduction initiatives in the fleet.  There is only one ship of this class, so 
it should not have a large impact on current fleet numbers, but it will serve as the basis 
for predicting future command ship manpower. Flag staff personnel have not been 
included in this study—up to 637 staff personnel may also be deployed on the ship. Nor 
does this study consider the 700 marines of the military lift detachment.   
LCC 19 carries one SH-3H Sea King helicopter.  A 10 man aircrew 
estimate is included in the model. 
d. LCC 20 Amphibious Command Ship 
LCC 20 also saw substantial crew size reductions.  In addition to 
conventional manpower reductions, LCC 20 also utilized civilian crew members to 
reduce manpower costs.  An “analysis found that using a mix of military and civilian 
personnel rather than all military personnel would reduce personnel costs by nearly a 
third.”  (GAO–03–520, 2003, p. 17) 
JFS states a military crew of 157 and a civilian crew of 146 for a total 
ship’s crew of 303, which will be used for this analysis.  (LCC 20 SMD states 159 ship’s 
crew but it gives no data on the civilian crew.)  Neither the Flag staff personnel of up to 
562 nor the military lift detachment of 700 marines are considered in this study. 
LCC 20 also carries an SH-3H Sea King helicopter.  A 10 man aircrew 
estimate is included in the model. 
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e. LPD 4 Amphibious Transport Dock 
Ship’s crew for Austin class ships of 420 was taken directly from JFS.  
LPD 4 SMD lists a ship crew of 413.  An LPD 4 can carry up to six CH-46D/E Sea 
Knight helicopters, although a typical operational load might include one SH-60, two 
CH-46, two UH-1, and AH-1 helicopters (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2009).  An estimate of 
105 is used to model the aircrew for this class. 
Flag staff personnel of up to 90 and military lift troops of 930 are not 
included.   
f. LPD 17 Amphibious Transport Dock 
The next 5 LPD ordered are of the San Antonio class.  Both JFS and a 
LPD17 Fact Sheet (“USS San Antonio LPD 17 Fact Sheet,” 2006) state crew size of 360.  
Three Marine liaison officers were not included in the count.  This number will also be 
used for future LPD estimates.  San Antonio class ships have the capacity for 1 CH-53E 
Sea Stallion, 2 CH-46E Sea Knights, or 1 MV-22 Osprey.  Aircrew requirements will be 
estimated at 35.  The 720 troops in the military lift are not included in this study. 
g. LSD 41 Amphibious Landing 
JFS data provides crew size of 413.  This is likely the initial crew size as 
of its 1985 commissioning date.  LSD 41 SMD lists a crew size of 323 after several 
rounds of crew decreases.  Similar to the LCC 19 above, the lower number of 323 will be 
used to estimate LSD 41 crew size to help capture crew reduction initiatives in the fleet.  
LSD 41 can carry two CH-53 Sea Stallions.  An aircrew of 70 is used for this class.  The 
military lift troops of 402 marines are not included in this study.   
6. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force  
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) ships provide combat logistics services to 
U.S. Navy ships at sea.  Some of the ships also have NFAF ships, such as the T-AOE, T-
AE, T-AKE, T-AFS, T-AO, and T-ARS, are government owned and use a mixed 
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complement of Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command (MSC) personnel and a 
“small contingent of Navy personnel aboard for operations support, supply coordination 
and helicopter operations.”  (“Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force,” 2009)  This “generally 
results in a smaller crew because these organizations employ more experienced seamen, 
have reduced watchstanding requirements, and use a different maintenance and training 
philosophy.” (GAO–03–520, 2003, p. 13)  Large MSC supply/support ships do not 
generally have the displacement/crew relationship that warships exhibit.  JFS crew data, 
listed in Table 2, generally agrees with MSC webpage data (http://www.msc.navy.mil/) 
and will be used for consistency of data.  Navy divers on salvage ships are not considered 
in this study.  Air crew of 35 on the T-AE 32 is taken directly from JFS.  Air crews on 
other NFAS are discussed in Section 7 below. 
Class Type Civilian Crew Military Crew Aircraft Aircrew
T-AOE 6  Fast Combat Support 160 28 2 MH-60 19 
T-AE 32  Ammo ships 133 4 2 CH-46 35 
T-AKE 1  Cargo and Ammo 113 11 2 MH-60 19 
T-AFS 5  Combat Stores 127 22 2 MH-60 19 
T-AO 187  Oiler 89 5 N/A 0 
T-ARS 50  Salvage ship 26 4 N/A 0 
Table 2.   Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 
7. Aircrew 
Embarked aircrew numbers for smaller ships (roughly from 1000 to 6000 tons) 
carrying smaller aircraft (typically SH-60 helicopters) were difficult to find.  JFS had 
only limited information available.  Estimates are based on the Oliver Hazard Perry class 
frigate (FFG 7), which carries two SH-60B Seahawks and has an air crew of 19 (Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, 2009) as an analogous model.  
According to JFS, Ticonderoga class cruisers (CG 47) carry two SH-60B 
Seahawks.  Similarly, T-AOE 6 class, T-AKE 1 class, and T-AFS 5 class ships each carry 
two MH-60 variants of the Seahawk helicopters.  These can be considered to be 
analogous systems.  The air crew for each of these current inventory ships will be  
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estimated at nineteen.  Arleigh Burke class destroyers (DDG 51) also have the capacity 
for two similar helicopters, although they typically only carry one.  Its aircrew will be 
estimated at 10 as explained in Table 3. 
The assumption is validated when ships of this size with available aircraft and 
aircrew data are examined.  The data in Table 3 does not lend itself well to regression 
techniques (the best R2 score was 0.0394).  Instead, average number of ships and aircrew 
were calculated to develop a crew/craft ratio of 9.7.  Using this ratio, 1 aircraft requires 
an aircrew of 10; 2 aircraft requires 19.  This ratio will be used for ships carrying only 
one helicopter (such as LCC 19 and 20) and for appropriate future ships. 
Country Ship Tonnage Crew Aircraft Aircrew 
Canada Halifax 4770 198 1 17 
Germany Sachsen 5600 255 2 13 
U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry 4100 200 2 19 
UK Type 22 4900 250 2 10 
France Floreal 2950 90 1 11 
Turkey Barbaros 3380 187 1 9 
Greece Hydra 3350 199 1 13 
Singapore Formidable 3200 71 1 15 
   Average: 1.375 13.375 
Table 3.   1000 to 6000 Ton ships with aircraft 
Aircrew sizes for amphibious ships (roughly from 16000 to 45000 tons) carrying 
a mix of aircraft (typically helicopters and harriers) were also difficult to find.  JFS had 
only limited information available; however, it did provide information for the aircraft 
and aircrew on the T-AE 32.  The T-AE 32 carries two CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters.  
These helicopters can provide the basis for converting known quantities of aircraft aboard 
ships to estimated aircrew numbers.  The two CH-46 helicopters have an aircrew of 35 
personnel.   
JFS states that LPD 17 can carry either one CH-53 Sea Stallion, or two CH-46 
Sea Knights, or one MV-22 Osprey.  This information provides a conversion method for 
aircrew of other aircraft.   
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Rough estimates are 10 aircrew personnel for smaller helicopters like the SH-60, 
17 for medium helicopters like the CH-46 and 35 aircrew personnel for large helicopters 
like the CH-53.  An estimate of 20 aircrew per Harrier is also made.  Table 4 provides the 
resulting aircrew estimates for the ships listed.  
 
Class Aircraft Estimates Aircrew
T-AE 32 2 CH-46 Sea Knight  35 
LPD 17 1 CH-53 Sea Stallion, or 
2 CH-46 Sea Knight 
2 CH-46 Sea Knight = 35 
1 CH-53 Sea Stallion = 35 
35 
LSD 41 2 CH-53 Sea Stallion 1 CH-53 = 35, 2 CH-53 = 2*35 = 70 70 
LPD 4 Up to 6 CH-46 estimate at 6 / 2 * 35 = 105 105 
LHA 1 9 CH-53 Sea Stallion or 
12 CH-46 Sea Knight  
estimate between :  
12 / 2 * 35 = 210 and 9 * 35 = 315 
263 
(avg) 
LHD 1 25 helos and 6 Harriers  
or 
20 Harriers and 6 SH-60 
estimate between:  
(10 SH-60, 10 CH-60, 5 CH-53, and 6 Harriers) 
10 / 2 * 19 + 10 / 2 * 35 + 5 * 35 + 6 * 20 = 565  
Or 20 * 20 + 6 / 2 * 19 = 457 
511 
(avg) 




Table 5.   Model of Current Ship Inventory Manpower 



















CVN 68 Aircraft Carrier 10 0 2480 3200 0 24800 32000 56800
CVN 65 Aircraft Carrier 1 0 2480 3350 0 2480 3350 5830
                  
CG 51 Cruiser 22 0 19 333 0 418 7326 7744
DDG 51 Destroyer  52 0 10 274 0 520 14248 14768
FFG 7 Frigate  30 0 19 200 0 570 6000 6570
                  
LCS 1 Littoral Combat Ship 1 0 19 45 0 19 45 64
MCM 1 Mine Warfare 14 0 0 84 0 0 1176 1176
PC 1 Patrol craft 8 0 0 39 0 0 312 312
                  
LHA 1 Amphibious Assault Ship 2 0 263 1230 0 526 2460 2986
LHD 1 Amphibious Assault Ship 7 0 511 1123 0 3577 7861 11438
LCC 19 Amphib Command Ship 1 0 10 600 0 10 600 610
LCC 20 Amphib Command Ship 1 146 10 157 146 10 157 313
LPD 4 Amphib Transport Dock 6 0 105 420 0 630 2520 3150
LPD 17 Amphib Transport Dock  3 0 35 360 0 105 1080 1185
LSD 41 Amphib Landing Dock 12 0 70 323 0 840 3876 4716
                  
SSN 688 Fast Attack Submarine 45 0 0 134 0 0 6030 6030
SSN 21 Fast Attack Submarine 3 0 0 140 0 0 420 420
SSN 774 Fast Attack Submarine 5 0 0 134 0 0 670 670
SSBN 730 Strategic Missile 
Submarine 14 0 0 155 0 0 2170 2170
SSGN 726 Cruise Missile 
Submarine 4 0 0 155 0 0 620 620
 AS 39 Sub Tender  2 0 0 1268 0 0 2536 2536
   
T-AOE 6 Fast Combat Support   4 160 19 28 640 76 112 828
T-AE 32 Ammo Ship 4 133 35 4 532 140 16 688
T-AKE 1 Cargo and Ammo 8 113 19 11 904 152 88 1144
T-AFS 5 Combat Stores 3 127 19 22 381 57 66 504
T-AO 187 Oiler 14 89 0 5 1246 0 70 1316
T-ARS 50 Salvage Ship 4 26 0 4 104 0 16 120
  280       3953 34930 95825 134708
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B. 313 SHIP NAVY 
The proposed 313-ship fleet outlined in 2006 is likely to consist of 11 aircraft 
carriers, 19 CG (X) cruisers, 7 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, 7 DD 1000 destroyers, 55 
DDG (X) destroyers, 55 littoral combat ships, 48 attack submarines, 14 strategic ballistic 
missile submarines; 4 guided missile submarines, 31 amphibious ships, a future maritime 
prepositioning force of 12 ships, and 50 NFAF combat logistics ships. 
This is a projection of the proposed fleet to around 2035.  Many studies such as 
the CBO report “Resource Implications of the Navy’s 313-Ship Plan,” Dec 16, 2005, 
estimate that the policy “achieve a 313-ship fleet in 2035” based on a 30-year ship-
building program.  Ship building plans like those in a CRS Report for Congress suggest 
that by 2035, most of the “X” classes of ships should be well into construction and 
utilization.   
Existing ships’ crews were again taken from JFS (and SMD as necessary) 
whenever possible.  Because many of these, such as CG(X)/DDG(X), LHA/D(X), 
LSD(X), and MPF(F) ships, are in the design or initial construction phases, they were not 
listed in JFS and SMD data does not exist.  Ship builder web pages, PEO briefs, reports 
to Congress, and other presentations provided the bulk of context for these proposed 
ships.  Historical numbers and trends were used when possible to help develop new crew 
estimates. Attempts were made to capture the benefits of optimal manning initiatives to 
shape future crew sizes. 
Table 10 on page 40 summarizes the final numbers based on the discussion 
below. 
1. Aircraft Carriers 
The mix of aircraft carrier classes that will exist in 2035 must be determined to 
credibly forecast required carrier personnel.  The commission dates of the CVN 68 class 
carriers can be seen in Table 6, with a rough average of one carrier every four years.  
Decommissioning dates are estimated at 45 years after commission.  The CVN 21 
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(formerly CVN (X)) program is the next generation of aircraft carrier, with CVN 78 as 
the lead ship.  JFS projects CVN 78 to be commissioned in 2015, CVN 79 commissioned 
in 2019, and CVN 80 in 2023, one every four years.  If this trend is continued out to 
2035, three more carriers will be delivered: CVN 81–83.  This is confirmed in a CBO 
report that “over the 2006–2035 period, a total of six CVN-21s would be purchased.”  
(“Resource Implications of the Navy’s 313-Ship Plan,” 2005, p. 4)  By that time, it is 
assumed that six CVN 68 will be retired, for a mix of five CVN 68 and six CVN 78. 
 
Hull # Ship Commission Decommission 
CVN 68 USS Nimitz 1975 2020 
CVN 69 USS Dwight D. Eisenhower 1977 2022 
CVN 70 USS Carl Vinson 1982 2027 
CVN 71 USS Theodore Roosevelt 1986 2031 
CVN 72 USS Abraham Lincoln 1989 2034 
CVN 73 USS George Washington 1992 2037 
CVN 74 USS John C. Stennis 1995 2040 
CVN 75 USS Harry S. Truman 1998 2043 
CVN 76 USS Ronald Reagan 2003 2048 
CVN 77 USS George H.W. Bush 2009 2054 
CVN 78 USS Gerald R. Ford 2015 2060 
CVN 79   2019 2064 
CVN 80   2023 2068 
CVN 81   2027 2072 
CVN 82   2031 2076 
CVN 83   2035 2080 
Table 6.   CVN 68 and CVN 78 Commissioning Dates 
a. CVN 68 Aircraft Carrier 
As with the current inventory analysis, CVN 68 ship crew of 3200 and 
aircrew of 2480 were taken directly from JFS. 
b. CVN 78 Aircraft Carrier 
As stated previously, CVN 78 is the lead ship for the next generation CVN 
21 program, also formerly known as CVN (X).  Northrop Grumman, the shipbuilder for 
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CVN 78 estimated a reduction in manning of 30%.  (“Gerald R. Ford Class of Nuclear-
Powered Aircraft Carriers,” 2009)  This seems overambitious, placing manning (ship 
crew plus aircrew) at around 3976.  No other estimates provide numbers that low.  JFS 
lists a ship complement (ship and aircrew) of 4660.  This is a reduction of approximately 
18% from the CVN 68 class.  A United States Navy CVN 21 Fact File (2009) claims 
“1000–1200 billet reductions (ships crew and air wing)”  and a naval-technology.com 
estimation of ship crew is between 2500 to 2700 (“Aircraft Carriers – CVN 21 Program,” 
2009).  CVN 78 ship’s crew will be estimated at 2700 as it is 500 less than CVN 68 
ship’s crew and approximately 18% less.  The remaining 1960 will be used to estimate 
the aircrew.  
2. Cruisers and Destroyers 
Cruisers and destroyers will continue to carry out their missions of surface and 
anti-submarine warfare to operations against enemy aircraft and land targets.  There will 
be 19 cruisers and 69 destroyers.  It is important to reflect manpower reduction and 
adjustment effects on crew size for forecasting into future requirements for the 313 Ship 
Navy.  With Smart Ship (SS) developed in current cruisers and OM initiatives introduced 
in DDG 1000, future CG (X) and DDG (X) crew sizes should be quite lean and mean.  
Aircrew for these ships will be estimated as previously developed, specifically 19. 
a. CG (X) Cruiser 
CG (X) is the proposed replacement for the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class 
cruisers.  It is expected to be a follow-on variant of the DDG 1000.  (Jane’s Fighting 
Ships, 2009)  A CRS Report for Congress (“Navy DD(X) and CG(X) Programs: 
Background and Issues for Congress,” 2005) projects 125 to 175 for CG (X) and DD (X).  
These low numbers reflect a very optimistic expectation of manpower reduction.  A 
cruiser crew size of 175 would be a reduction of approximately 47% from current sizes.  
Although ambitious, 175 will be used to capture the possible results of OM initiatives by 
the year 2035.  CG(X) will carry the equivalent of two SH-60B Seahawks, so an aircrew 
of 19 will be included. 
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b. DDG 51 Destroyer 
As stated previously, the Arleigh Burke destroyer class had two versions, 
Flight I and Flight II.  Assuming no procurement of Arleigh Burke class destroyers past 
to currently authorized DDG 112 and an expected service life of 35 years, 34 of these 
destroyers will remain in the 313 Ship Navy.  It is likely that the most recent versions of 
the ship (DDG 79–112) will be the ones to remain.  Current manpower levels represent 
modernization and OM initiatives, this DDG 85–90 SMD data of 276 will be applied.  
DDG 51’s typically carry one SH-60B Seahawk, so an aircrew of 10 will be included. 
c. DDG 1000 Destroyer 
According to JFS, the DDG 1000 program has been curtailed and only 
three ships are to be built.  However, the 313 Ship Navy still calls for 7 DDG 1000 
destroyers on the assumption that the program may be restarted sometime in the future. 
Navy PEO Ships projects a DDG 1000 crew size of 114.  (“Zumwalt Class (DDG 1000),” 
2009)  This seems unrealistically ambitious.  JFS reports a more pragmatic crew size of 
142.  The model will use the lower number from the CRS report (“Navy DD(X) and 
CG(X) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,” 2005) of 125.  This number 
seems practical while still reflecting the OM initiatives by year 2035.  DDG 1000 will 
carry 2 MH-60 or 1 MH-60 and 3 UAV’s; an aircrew of 19 will be included. 
d. DDG (X) Destroyer 
Sixty-nine total destroyers are called for in the 313 Ship Navy.  
Presumably, the ships will range somewhere between current destroyers, DDG 1000, and 
some future DDG (X).  The DDG 1000 program, formerly DD (X), has been cancelled 
due to cost overruns, with only three ships to be built, but 7 are still included in the 313 
ship plan.  It is assumed that 39 DDG 51 class ships will still be active.  Twenty-eight 
DDG (X) class destroyers must then be commissioned to fulfill the 69 ship requirement. 
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Manning should be lower than current destroyer levels of 333, but more 
than the ambitious 114 projected by Navy PEO Ships for DDG 1000.  The relative size 
differences between current cruisers and destroyers listed in Table 7 will be used to 
determine the DDG (X) crew size.   
 
Cruiser Crew Destroyer Crew
CG52 w/o SS 339 DDG51 FLIA 271 
CG52 w SS 326 DDG51 FLIIA 278 
   DDG51 FLIIB 276 
Avg. crew size: 332.5 Avg. crew size: 275 
 CG/DDG ratio: .827 
Table 7.   DDG and CG crew sizes 
The crew size ratio between current CG and DDG ships is approx .827.  If 
175 is used to estimate CG (X) crew size, and the .827 ratio is used to maintain relative 
sizes between the ships, then DDG (X) crew size will be estimated at 145.  Like the CG 
(X) estimate, it is an ambitious number, attempting to capture manpower reductions by 
2035, but it is more conservative than DDG 1000’s crew of 114.  DDG(X) will also carry 
the equivalent of two SH-60B Seahawks, so an aircrew of 19 is included.    
3. Littoral Vessels 
The 313 Ship Navy only has one class of ship, the LCS, specifically designed to 
operate in littoral environment.  It has done away with the mine warfare ship and the 
patrol craft, missions presumably to be filled by the LCS. 
a. LCS 1 Littoral Combat Ship 
As previously mentioned, JFS states a crew size of 50 for the LCS 1 class 
and 40 for the LCS 2 class.  An average estimate of 45 billets will be used.  LCS carries 2 
MH-60 or 1 MH-60 and 3 UAV’s; an aircrew of 19 will be included. 
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4. Submarines 
The submarine force of the 313 Ship Navy is 40 SSN, 14 SSBN, and 4 SSGN.  A 
Defense Science Board panel report in 1998 rejected “the suggestion for a force mix that 
includes diesel-electric submarines” and asserts that “the Virginia-class follow-on should 
be a “large” nuclear ship” (“Future Attack Submarine,” 2005)  
According to JFS, a program of 30 Virginia class submarines is planned.  A 
military.com compilation of OMB data projects the last SSN 774 to be commissioned by 
2026.  There are currently 45 active Los Angeles class submarines.  If the older 
submarines are retired when the newer submarines are commissioned, the Fast Attack 
submarine force in 2035 may be modeled as a mix of 30 SSN 774, 3 SSN 21, and 15 SSN 
688. 
Little information on SSN (X) and SSBN (X) is programs available.  They will 
not be included in this work.  It is assumed that the total number of submarines would 
remain constant and any “X” submarine will likely have manpower requirements similar 
to its predecessor. 
a. SSN 688 Fast Attack Submarine (Los Angeles) 
As previously stated, there is a relatively large difference between JFS and 
SMD data.  The JFS number of 134 will be used as the estimate for consistency when 
comparing crew sizes to foreign ships  
b. SSN 21 Fast Attack Submarine (Seawolf) 
Again, there is a relatively large difference between JFS data and SSN 21 
SMD data.  Again JFS numbers of 140 will be used to provide consistency with foreign 
classes. 
c. SSN 774 Fast Attack Submarine (Virginia) 
Ship’s crew of 134 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 774 SMD data was 
not available at the time of this study. 
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d. SSBN 730 Strategic Missile Submarines 
Ship’s crew of 155 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 730 SMD has a 
ship’s crew of 159. 
e. SSGN 726 Cruise Missile Submarines 
Ship’s crew of 155 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 726 SMD data was 
not available at the time of this study.  It is assumed that crew size and structure would be 
closely analogous to the SSBN crew. 
f. AS 39 Sub Tenders 
Ship’s crew of 1268 was taken directly from JFS. 
5. Amphibious Ships 
Marine Corps plans project 15 Amphibious Task Force ships (1 LHA, 4 LHD, 5 
LPD-17, and 5 LSD) are required to deploy the Assault Echelon (AE) of an Amphibious 
MEB.  Thirty such ships would be required to deploy the 2 MEB Assault Echelons 
prescribed in Strategic Planning Guidance.  The Marine Corps estimates that 33 ships are 
the minimum needed to account for a ship availability of 85% (Strock, 2004).  The 313 
Ship Navy plans for 31 Amphibious ships. 
a. LHA/D (X) Amphibious Assault Ship 
According to JFS, the LHA Replacement (LHA I) design was to be a 
modified version of the LHD 8 design.  Apparently, however, LHA 6 will fill the 
requirement of LHA I until LH (X) is developed.  Three or four LHA 6 will be ordered, 
with 7 LHA (X) to follow, the first being operational around FY 2030. (“LH(X) 
Amphibious Assault Ship,” 2008)  Ship specifications, including manpower 
requirements, are still to be determined. 
As was seen previously, there appears to be a learning curve with respect 
to crew size.  The last several LHA and LHD ships are listed above in Table 1.  A 
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regression of the data shown in Figure 10, including Tarawa’s crew data, produces a 
power series equation, y = 0.0364*x-0.2462, where y is the crew/weight ratio and x is the 
number of the ship in succession, with an adjusted R2 value of 0.9590.  Using LHA/D (X) 
as ship number six produces a predicted crew/weight ratio of 0.0234.  With some insight 
that LHA/D (X) will be a modification of LHD 8 and LHA 6, an estimated ship 
displacement of 43000 tons is multiplied to the ratio producing a prediction of 1006 
ship’s crew.   
Crew Size Normailzed to Ship Displacement 
(including Tarawa class)
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Figure 10.   Normalized Crew Size 
The air wing capacity is expected to be similar to that of current Wasp 
class amphibious assault ships: “a mix of 25 helicopters and six to eight Harriers” or “20 
AV-8B Harriers and four to six SH-60B Seahawk helicopters.”  (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 
2009)  An estimate of 511 aircrew requirements will be used.  See section 7 “Aircrew” 
above for further discussion of aircrew estimates. 
b. LPD 17 Amphibious Transport Dock 
Ship’s crew of 360 was taken directly from JFS.  San Antonio class ships 
have the capacity for 1 CH-53E Sea Stallion, or 2 CH-46E Sea Knights, or 1 MV-22 
Osprey.  Aircrew will be estimated to be 35.  See Section 7 “Aircrew” above for further 
discussion of aircrew estimates. 
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c. LSD (X) Landing Ship Dock 
Little information is available on design characteristics for LSD (X).  Mr. 
Jim Strock, Director, Seabasing Integration Division, states in a brief titled “Seabasing A 
Joint Force Enabler In Area-Denial and Anti-Access Environments” (2004) that “LPD 17 
is the likely candidate for LSD (X).”  LPD 17 requirements of 360 ship’s crew and 35 
aircrew will therefore be used for LSD (X) manpower. 
6. Maritime Prepositioning Ships (Future) 
The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), are squadrons of various 
support ships strategically located around the world. Each squadron is to be able to load 
and transport all MEB equipment to any required location.  MPF(F) is to provide 
indefinite “sea-basing” support to the MEB from safe international waters (Cook, 2004, 
p. 55).  Senate Report 110–077 “National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 
2008” confirms that MPF(F) ships are planned to be operated by a Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) crew.  There are two military crew components in addition to the 
civilian MSC crew (“Marine Air Ground Task Force Composition and Utilization brief,” 
2008, p. 14).  The Navy Support Element (NSE) is a “detachment of Navy cargo handling 
force personnel…tasked with conducting the off-load and ship-to-shore movement of 
maritime prepositioned equipment/supplies.”  (“Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms,” 2001, p. 376)  The Sea Base Echelon (SBE) typically 
consists of the assault echelon’s support crews, which remain at the sea-base away from 
the assault operations, providing support by vertical replenishment.  Only notional crew 
sizes are available at this time.  The data in Table 8 was extracted from a 2005 brief 
(“Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future),” p. 12).  Like MSC supply/support ships, 
MPF(F) ships do not generally have the displacement/crew relationship that warships 






Ship MSC SBE NSE
MPF(F) LHD/LHA (R) 285 1542 554 
MPF(F) LMSR  30 205 110 
MPF(F) MLP 50 1112 114 
MPF(F) T-AKE 123 10 61 
Table 8.   Notional MPF(F) Crew 
7. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force  
a. T-AO, T-AOE, T-AKE, ARS, T-AGOS, and T-ATF 
With the sea-basing concept expanding in the future, the MSC NFAF “will 
continue to be a vital, cost- effective and innovative element of the U.S. Navy.”  (“Naval 
Fleet Auxiliary Force,” 2009)  T-AO(X), T-AOE(X), ARS(X), and T-ATF(X) are the 
next generation NFAF ships.  Focus of improvement will likely be on cargo handling and 
capacity.  For example, the new T-AOE(X) class will provide a next generation of triple 
product replenishment capabilities.  (“T-AOE(X) Replenishment Ship / Triple Product 
Station Ship,” 2006)  It is unclear when the “X” class NFAF will be deployed; it has been 
reported that DoD cancelled the T-AOE(X) program in the FY 2007 defense budget 
process (Castelli, 2005).  Manpower requirements are also unclear.  Large MSC 
supply/support ships do not generally have the displacement/crew relationship that 
warships exhibit.  Current numbers of equivalent current ships, provided in Table 9 
should suffice. 
Class Type Civilian Crew Military Crew Aircraft Aircrew
T-AO (X)  Oiler 89 5 N/A 0 
T-AOE (X)  Fast Combat Support 160 28 2 MH-60 19 
T-AKE 1  Cargo and Ammo 113 11 2 MH-60 19 
T-ARS (X)  Salvage ship 26 4 N/A 0 
TAGOS 23 Ocean Surveillance 26 16 N/A 0 
T-ATF (X)  Fleet Ocean Tug 16 4 N/A 0 
Table 9.   Future Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 
 39
b. JHSV High Speed Connector  
“The JHSV program would provide high speed intra-theater surface 
connector capability…capable of transporting personnel, equipment and supplies over 
operational distances in support of maneuver and sustainment operations.”  (“Joint High 
Speed Vessel (JHSV),” 2008)  Contracts for the preliminary design of JHSV were 
awarded to Austal USA, Bath Iron Works and Bollinger Shipyards (teamed with Incat)  It 
is likely that the vessel will model the WestPac Express or the Jervis Bay.  It is unclear as 
to whether it will be manned with a civilian or navy crew.  For this study, the JHSV crew 
will be estimated with Jervis Bay’s complement of 20 (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2009). 
c. JCC(X) Command Ship 
Naval command ships provide communications, coordinate activities, and 
serve as the flagships of Fleet Commanders.  The Navy currently has two dedicated 
command ships after the decommissioning of USS La Salle and the USS Coronado.  The 
USS Blue Ridge and USS Mount Whitney have been in service for approximately 40 
years.  Two new LPD 17 ships, configured as command ships, may be commissioned to 
replace LCC 19 and 20.  LCC or AGF Command Ship classes are most likely to be 
models for JCC(X). 
Crew size has been sharply reduced from 786 to 600 (LCC 19) to 303 
(LCC 20) using crew optimizing techniques and a civilian/military mixed crew policy.  It 
may be unlikely; however, that manpower can be reduced much more for JCC(X).  GAO-
03–520 reported unfavorably on the “lack of any formal reduction goal on the JCC(X) 
command ship” (GAO-03–520, 2003, p. 10).  It is further reported that the “JCC(X) 
command ship program made very limited use of human systems integration to optimize 
crew size…The program also did not hold program managers accountable for reducing 
crew size below that of the legacy command ships.”  (GAO-03–520, 2003, p. 16)  
Reflecting this insight, current crew sizes 146 civilian and 157 sailor requirements for 
LCC20 will be used to estimate JCC(X).  An aircrew of 10 requirements for 1 SH-3H Sea 

























CVN 68 Aircraft Carrier 5 0 2480 3200 0 12400 16000 28400
CVN 78 Aircraft Carrier 6 0 1960 2700 0 11760 16200 27960
                  
CG (X) Cruiser  19 0 19 175 0 361 3325 3686
DDG 51 (w/SS) Destroyer 34 0 10 276 0 340 9384 9724
DDG 1000 Destroyer 7 0 19 125 0 133 875 1008
DDG (X) Destroyer  28 0 19 145 0 532 4060 4592
                  
LCS 1 Littoral Combat Ship  55  0  19 45 0 1045 2475 3520
                  
SSN 688 Fast attack submarine  15 0 0 134 0 0 2010 2010
SSN 21 Fast attack submarine 3 0 0 140 0 0 420 420
SSN 774 Fast attack submarine  30 0 0 134 0 0 4020 4020
SSBN 730 Strategic missile 
submarines 14 0 0 155 0 0 2170 2170
SSGN 726 Cruise missile 
submarines 4 0 0 155 0 0 620 620
AS 39 Sub Tenders 2 0 0 1268 0 0 2536 2536
                  
LHA/D (X) Amphib Assault Ship 9 0 511 1006 0 4599 9054 13653
LPD 17 Amphib Transport Dock 10 0 35 360 0 350 3600 3950
LSD (X) Amphib Landing Dock 12 0 35 360 0 420 4320 4740
                  
MPF(F) LHD  1 285 1542 554 285 1542 554 2381
MPF(F) LMSR  3 30 205 110 90 615 330 1035
MPF(F) MLP 3 50 1112 114 150 3336 342 3828
MPF(F) T-AKE  3 123 10 61 369 30 183 582
MPF(F) LHA(R ) 2 285 1542 554 570 3084 1108 4762
                  
T-AO (X) Oiler 15 89 0 5 1335 0 75 1410
T-AOE (X) Fast Combat Support 4 160 19 28 640 76 112 828
T-AKE 1 Cargo and Ammo  11 113 19 11 1243 209 121 1573
ARS (X) Salvage Ship 4 26 0 4 104 0 16 120
T-AGOS 23 Ocean Surveillance 5 26 0 16 130 0 80 210
T-ATF (X) Fleet Ocean Tug 4 16 0 4 64 0 16 80
JHSV High Speed Connector 3 0 0 20 0 0 60 60
JCC (X) Command Ship 2 146 10 157 292 20 314 626
  313       5272 32245 92987 130504
Table 10.   Model of Proposed 313 Ship Navy Manpower 
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C. NEW NAVY FIGHTING MACHINE 
The NNFM puts forward a bi-modal navy of 677 ships plus 400 small inshore 
patrol craft.  The “blue water” component is to consist of 6 nuclear powered aircraft 
carriers (CVN), 10 light aircraft carriers (CVL), 30 destroyers, 90 frigates, 20 land attack 
corvettes, and 9 Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers.  The submarine force completes the 
“blue water” fleet, but is sure to play a role in the “green water” fleet as well; especially 
the Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) subs.  The force consists of 40 nuclear attack 
submarines, 40 AIP submarines, and 9 strategic ballistic missile submarines.  The “green 
water” component is made up of 8 CVLs, 12 fleet station ships, 12 naval gunfire frigates, 
12 fast mine warfare vessels, 12 anti-submarine warfare corvettes, 160 offshore patrol 
vessels, and 30 coastal combatants.  The fleet is supported by 125 “deliver and sustain” 
MSC ships and 50 NFAF combat logistics ships. 
As with the 313 ship analysis, this alternative configuration is projected to around 
2035, allowing any new ship types to be designed, built, and incorporated into the fleet.  
Attempts were made to capture the benefits of optimal manning initiatives to shape future 
crew sizes whenever possible.   
Table 23 on page 69 summarizes the final numbers based on the discussions 
below. 
1. Aircraft Carriers 
As stated previously, the mix of aircraft carrier classes that will exist in 2035 must 
be determined to credibly forecast required carrier personnel.  Based on the previous 
discussion, 6 new carriers are projected to be delivered by 2035.  These new CVNs will 
be the 6 required for the NNFM.  In addition, the NNFM calls for 18 new light aircraft 
carriers (CVL) “specifically designed for STOVL, UAV, and VTOL operations.” 
(NNFM, 2009, p.22)  Ten CVL would be designated for “Blue Water” operations and the 
remaining eight designated for the “Green Water” component.  Manpower requirements 
would likely be similar for either version.  The CVL will be discussed in more depth 
below. 
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a. CVN 78 Aircraft Carrier 
CVN 78 is the lead ship for the next generation CVN 21 program, also 
formerly known as CVN (X).  JFS lists a ship complement (ship and aircrew) of 4660.  
Through some estimation of projected manpower reductions discussed previously, CVN 
78 ship’s crew will be estimated at 2700, an 18% reduction of requirements from CVN 
68.  The remaining 1960 will be used to estimate the aircrew.  See Part B. 313 Ship Navy, 
Section 1 Aircraft Carriers above for further explanation.  
b. CVL (X) Light Aircraft Carrier 
The NNFM calls for smaller, less expensive, more numerous aircraft 
carriers specifically designed for STOVL, VTOL, and possibly UAV; the notional 
capability of carrying and conducting operations for 20 F-35B aircraft.  A CVL of 20000 
to 30000 would likely suffice.  This is a novel idea for the modern U.S. fleet although 
there are many examples in foreign fleets.  A sample of 14 carriers is provided in Table 
11.  
Table 11.   Sample of Various Aircraft Carriers 
                                                 
12 No aircrew data was available from JFS.  These two ships are not included in the aircrew regression. 
Country Ship Displacement Crew 
Approx # 
of planes aircrew
Thailand Chakri Naruebet 11485 455 12 146 
Italy Garibaldi 13850 582 15 230 
Spain Prinipe De Asturias 17188 555 10 201 
UK Illustrious 20600 685 24 366 
Spain Juan Carlos I 27079 243 20 172 
Italy Cavour 27,100 528 20 168 
India Vikrant 37500 1400 12 N/A 
France Charkes De Gaulle 42500 1256 30 610 
USA America (LHA-6) 44850 1059 23 N/A12 
Russia Kuznetsov 45900 1960 22 626 
USA Kitty Hawk 83960 2930 52 2480 
U.S. Enterprise 89,600 3350 52 2480 
U.S. Nimitz 91,487 3200 52 2480 
U.S. Gerald R Ford 100000 2700 75 1960 
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Regression analyses were conducted, using displacement as a proxy for 
capability, and by extension, a factor of crew size.  First the number of planes versus 
displacement was examined for all the carriers in the sample to estimate the size of 
aircraft carrier needed.   
The linear regression, seen in Figure 11, produced an equation of: y = 
.0006 * x + 2.286, where y is capacity of planes an aircraft carrier of x tons can carry.  
The adjusted R2 value is 0.8732.  Additional regression statistics can be found in 
Appendix D.  An aircraft carrier carrying 20 planes is estimated to displace 2950013 tons. 
With an F-score significance of 6.11E-07, there is certainty that the 
number of planes an aircraft carrier can operate is a function of its size.  The U.S. 
carriers, clustered at the top right of the graph, may be influencing the slope of the 
regression line with their large economies of scale that smaller CV’s may not have.   An 
additional regression was performed without the U.S. CVN’s and also provided in Figure 
11.  Its resultant equation is y = 0.0003 * x + 10.475.  Additional regression statistics can 
be found in Appendix D.  Its F-score significance is acceptable at 0.0711, although not as 
good.  Its adjusted R2 value of 0.2698 is not good, but its Coefficient of Variation (CV) is 
good at 0.182.  (The previous regression with U.S. CVN’s had a CV of 0.236.)  An 
aircraft carrier carrying 20 planes is estimated to displace 3175014 tons with this 
regression. 
Arguments for either regression model can be made.  The first regression 
with all the carriers in the sample is realistic and has strong statistical numbers but may 
be influenced by the large American super-carriers.  The second regression without the 
U.S. ships does not have as strong statistical support, but it is also realistic and may better 
model aircraft carrier characteristics at the size of interest.  The average of the two 
predicted values, 30600 will be used to estimate the displacement of a CVL capable of 
carrying a mix of aircraft, up to 20 planes.  
                                                 
13 y = .0006 * x + 2.286 = 29523.3. 
14 y = 0.0003 * x + 10.475 = 31750. 
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Number of Planes as a Function of Displacement
n=14 or n=10
y = 0.0003x + 10.475,  R2 = 0.351































Figure 11.   Number of Planes as a Function of Size 
Crew size versus displacement was examined next.  Crew size estimates 
were developed in a similar manner to the method used to determine displacement.  Two 
linear regressions were performed, one with U.S. carriers and the other without.  As 
shown in Figure 12, the lines are nearly comparable in the vicinity of the determined ship 
size.   
Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage
n=14 or n=10
y = 0.0323x - 58.228,  R2 = 0.6315



























Figure 12.   CV Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
The first regression with all aircraft carriers in the sample produced 
equation: y = .0339 * x – 89.405, where y is the estimated crew size given a ship 
displacement x tons.  The adjusted R2 value is 0.8980.  The second regression was  
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performed without the outliers and produced an equation of: y = 0.0323 * x – 58.228, 
with an adjusted R2 value of 0.5854.  Additional regression statistics can be found for 
both in appendix D.    
Predicted values were 930 and 948, respectively, using the estimate of 
30600 tons.  The average of 94015 was used to estimate the manpower required for the 
NNFM light carrier.  This is a conservatively high estimate.  Based on the above data, the 
HMS Illustrious with a crew size of 685 would be good model to build from.  
A similar approach was used to estimate CVL aircrew.  Two linear 
regressions of aircrew versus displacement were performed; one with U.S. carriers and 
the other without.  Two carriers without aircrew data were omitted from the regression.  
As shown in Figure 13, the lines diverge sharply.  The first regression with all aircraft 
carriers in the sample produced equation: y = 0.0288x – 375.26, where y is the estimated 
aircrew size given a ship displacement x tons.  The adjusted R2 value is 0.9141.  The 
second regression was performed without the American outliers and produced an 
equation of: y = 0.0132x – 23.895, with an adjusted R2 value of 0.7108.  Both are good 
models.  Additional regression statistics can be found for both in appendix D.  Predicted 
values were 506 and 380 respectively using the estimate of 30600 tons.   
Aircrew as a Function of Displacement
n=12 or n=8
y = 0.0288x - 375.26,  R2 = 0.9141
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Figure 13.   CV Aircrew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
                                                 
15 y = .0339 * 30600 – 89.405 = 930.2, y = 0.0323 * 30600–58.228 = 947.9. 
(930.2+947.9)/2 = 939.1. 
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An alternate analysis on aircrew versus number of aircraft was also 
conducted.  Again, two linear regressions were performed with the results shown in 
Figure 14.  Additional regression statistics can be found for both in Appendix D.  The 
results were 461 for the regression with U.S. CVNs and 33416 for the regression without 
U.S. CVNs.  
 
Aircrew as a Function of Aircraft
n=12 or n=8
y = 44.322x - 425.07,  R2 = 0.7974



























Figure 14.   CV Aircrew Size as a Function of Aircraft (Alternate Analysis) 
American warships tend to be larger and generally have larger crews.  
This is reflected in the U.S. CVNs’ influence on the regression.  By using an average of 
all four predictions, American naval propensities may be captured while avoiding an 
overestimation.  An aircrew estimation of 420 will be used for the CVL. 
2. Destroyers, Frigates, and Corvettes 
Destroyers, frigates, and corvettes perform the day-to-day missions of surface 
warfare, anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and land strike.  Although not multi-
mission or as heavily armed as their 313 Ship counterparts, in the NNFM fleet they are 
more numerous and more distributable, and therefore able to work in mutually supporting 
complementary groups of ships.  The NNFM proposes 149 of these ships; 39 destroyers, 
90 frigates, and 20 land attack missile corvettes. 
                                                 
16 Based on 20 planes. 
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a. DDG 51 Destroyer 
The NNFM includes 30 blue water Aegis destroyers.  It is likely that 
approximately 34 Arleigh Burke class destroyers will be in service in 2035, assuming no 
procurement past 2009 and an expected service life of 35 years.  Because there will be 
three DDG 1000 destroyers in service as well, only 27 DDG 51 class destroyers will be 
used in this model.  The remaining seven can be made available for possible conversion 
and experimentation of new ship types, such as the DDG-BMD ship below.  Current 
manpower levels represent results of modernization and OM initiatives.  DDG 85–90 
SMD data of 276 will be used. 
DDG 51s typically carry one SH-60B Seahawks.  An aircrew of 10 will be 
included. 
b. DDG 1000 Destroyer 
As stated previously, the DDG 1000 program has been curtailed and only 
three ships are to be built.  Although the 313 Ship plan calls for a total of 7 Zumwalt class 
destroyers to be built, the NNFM does not require any more than what has already been 
procured.  The model will use a crew size estimate of 125 as discussed earlier.  This 
number seems practical while still reflecting OM results hoped for in the year 2035.   
DDG 1000 will carry 2 MH-60 or 1 MH-60 and 3 UAV’s; an aircrew of 
19 will be included. 
c. FF (X) Blue Water Frigate  
The NNFM also calls for 90 “Blue Water” frigates.  Because the last FFG 
7 class frigate was commissioned in 1989 and there are no current USN procurement 
plans, a new FF (X) frigate is envisioned for the NNFM.  The frigate will be a cost 
effective surface combatant emphasizing sea control and protection of shipping, such as 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and close in air defense.  The frigate should have well 
integrated hard and soft kill point defense capabilities.  “There are many international 
frigates and corvettes that serve as examples for developing and affordable design” 
(NNFM, 2009, p. 46)   
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Frigates have grown in size from about 1,500 tons displacement to over 
4,000 tons (large corvettes to frigates).  A sample of 22 frigates from various countries 
has been collected in Table 12.  Although crew sizes are greater relative to displacement 
than for the much larger DDG 1000, a cautious approach will be taken regarding 
manning reduction.  The new frigate crew size will be based on a simple regression 
model. 







Frigate France  Destienne dOrves 1330 90 0 0 
Frigate Iran  Alvand 1350 125 0 0 
Frigate Iran  Moudge 1400 130 0 0 
Corvette India  Kora 1460 134 0 1 
Corvette Malaysia  Kedah 1650 68 0 1 
Frigate Japan  Ishikari/Yuubari class 1690 95 0 0 
Corvette Germany  Braunschweig 1840 58 0 1 
Corvette Turkey  Milgem 2000 93 0 1 
Frigate Poland  Gawron II 2035 74 0 1 
Frigate Italy  Lupo 2525 177 N/A 1 
Frigate France  Floreal 2950 90 11 1 
Frigate Italy  Maestrale 3200 205 N/A 2 
Frigate Singapore  Formidable 3200 71 15 1 
Frigate Greece  Hydra 3350 199 13 1 
Frigate Turkey  Barbaros 3380 187 9 1 
Frigate France  La Fayette 3750 153 N/A 1 
Frigate China  Type 054 3900 190 N/A 1 
Frigate U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry 4100 200 19 2 
Frigate UK  Duke 4200 181 N/A 1 
Frigate Canada  Halifax  4770 198 17 1 
Frigate UK Type 22 4900 250 10 2 
Frigate Germany Sachsen 5600 255 13 2 
Table 12.   Sample of 20 Frigates and Corvettes 
A linear regression of the data seen in Figure 15 produces an equation of: 
y = .0371 * x + 37.635, where y is the estimate manpower requirement for a frigate of x 
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tons.  The adjusted R2 value is 0.6062 and the F-score significance is 1.2E-05.  
Additional regression statistics can be found in Appendix D.   
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=22



















Figure 15.   Frigate Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
The NNFM calls for a frigate of approximately 2500–3000 tons, so the 
average of 2750 tons was used.  So: y = .0371 * (2750) + 37.635 = 139.66.  A frigate of 
2750 would require a crew of approximately 140.  Any of the ships between Turkey’s 
Milgem and Singapore’s Formidable would make strong candidates with the desired 
characteristics.  An estimated crew size of 140 is credible yet conservative.  These 
frigates will also carry the equivalent of two SH-60B Seahawks.  An aircrew of 19 
requirements will be included. 
d. LA (X) Land Attack Corvettes 
The NNFM diminishes the land-attack capability of the DDG force.  To 
replace that capability, it proposes a small “Arsenal” ship, a land attack vessel 
reminiscent of the Arsenal Attack ship promoted by ADM Boorda, but armed with one-
tenth of the missiles carried in his design.  The concept is a simple corvette (around 1000 
tons) carrying 50 land attack missiles; small, stealthy and inexpensive.  A small Arsenal 
ship would be a new type of vessel.  For an estimate of crew size a sample of 22 foreign 
corvettes, missile attack craft, and small frigates, listed in Table 13, are used. 
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Type Country Ship Displacement Crew Size Air Crew # of helos
Frigate Turkey  Barbaros 3380 187 9 1 
Frigate Greece  Hydra 3350 199 13 1 
Frigate Italy  Maestrale 3200 205 N/A 2 
Frigate Singapore  Formidable 3200 71 15 1 
Frigate France  Floreal 2950 90 11 1 
Frigate Italy  Lupo 2525 177 N/A 1 
Frigate Poland  Gawron II 2035 74 N/A 1 
Frigate Japan  Ishikari/Yuubari class 1690 95 0 0 
Frigate Iran  Moudge 1400 130 0 0 
Frigate Iran  Alvand 1350 125 0 0 
Frigate France  Destienne dOrves 1330 90 0 0 
Corvette Turkey  Milgem 2000 93 N/A 1 
Corvette Germany  Braunschweig 1840 58 N/A 1 
Corvette Malaysia  Kedah 1650 68 N/A 1 
Corvette India  Kora 1460 134 N/A 1 
Corvette Israel Sa’ar V 1295 64 0 0 
Corvette Sweden  Visby  620 43 0 0 
Fast Attack Craft Greece  Super Vita 660 45 0 0 
Fast Attack Craft Singapore  Fearless 500 32 0 0 
Fast Attack Craft Norway  Skjold 273 20 0 0 
Fast Attack Craft Finland  Hamina 270 29 0 0 
Fast Attack Craft China  Houbei 220 12 0 0 
Table 13.   Sample of 22 Ships for small Arsenal Land Attack Ships 
The regression, shown in Figure 16, produced an equation of y = 0.0433 * 
x + 19.633, where y is the estimate of crew size for a “Light Arsenal” corvette of x tons.  
The adjusted R2 value is 0.5804 and the F-score significance is 2.297E-05.  Additional 
regression statistics can be found in Appendix D.  The Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessment (CSBA) provided a notional land attack ship based on the Israeli Sa’ar V in a 
July 2009 “Green Water Navy 2029” war game.  Therefore, a displacement of 1300 tons 
was used to model the land attack ship, resulting in an estimated crew size of 76 (y = 
0.0433 * (1300) + 19.633 = 75.923).  The estimate of 76 may be a high.  Versions of the 
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larger 20000 ton, 500 missile Arsenal ship were envisioned to have a very small crew of 
55.  No aircraft are to be embarked, and thus no aircrew is included. 
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=22


















Figure 16.   Land Attack Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
e. DDG-BMD (X) Ballistic Missile Defense 
The NNFM includes a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) component 
consisting of a force of 9 DDGs.  The seven surplus DDG 51 class destroyers designated 
above can be modified for strong, dedicated BMD.  A ship’s crew of 276 and an aircrew 
of 10 will be used for these ships.  The remaining two DDG-BMD ships will be modified 
versions of the DDG (X), with 145 ship’s crew and 19 aircrew. 
3. Littoral Vessels (Green Water Component) 
The green water component is made up of relatively small, single-purpose, 
distributable vessels.  It can be used for forward presence for peacekeeping and stability 
with a host nation or to punch through coastal clutter, securing the area for high value 
national assets.  Key to the green water component is the capability to “clear mines, take 
out small combatant threats, and deal with coastal submarines.”  (NNFM, 2009, p. 11) 
a. GFS (X) Global Fleet Station Ships 
Global Fleet Station ships function like a command ship with facilities for 
staff, work/berthing spaces for various numbers of NGO humanitarian assistance 
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personnel, and berthing for inshore and offshore patrol craft when necessary.  It offers 
limited logistics support as well.  “The Navy has been working on projects like the 
Global Fleet Station, a forward operating base at sea capable of surging military forces 
and humanitarian aid to shore.” (Mcleary, 2009)  The NNFM proposes a ship 
approximately two-thirds the size of an LPD-17 or JCC(X) with a command ship 
configuration.  LPD 17 will be used as a basis for estimation. 
The reconfiguration of the amphibious transport dock USS Coronado 
(LPD 11) to a command ship (AGF 11) will be used as an analogy for crew size 
estimation.  LPD 11 initially had a manpower requirement of 420.  After reconfiguration, 
it had a crew size of 243 (117 USN, 126 civilian).  This is a 42% reduction in size, split 
approximately 50% USN and 50% civilian.  The command ship LCC 20 has a similar 
mix of manpower (156 USN, 146 civilian).  Following this example, LPD 17 with a crew 
size of 360, would have a manpower requirement of 20817 after reconfiguration.  The 
50/50 split would result in a crew of 104 USN and 104 civilian.  A conservatively high 
estimate of 115 USN and 115 civilians will be used.   
Three or four helicopters will be embarked, so an aircrew detachment of 
38 will be included.  This study does not include the varying command staff onboard. 
b. NGFS (X) Naval Gunfire Support 
The NNFM enhances its littoral warfare operations ashore by utilizing low 
cost, high volume naval gunfire support (NGFS).  The NGFS ship will be a single-
purpose ship carrying two Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) with 2000 rounds.  New high-
capacity projectiles are being developed with increased payloads and extended ranges.  
“Hull size will be determined by minimum space and sturdiness required for the two guns 
and their ammunition.”  (NNFM, 2009, p 22)   
The modern U.S. Navy has not had a ship with the sole role of NGFS 
since the battleship.  DDG 1000 is planned to play a NGFS role, but this multi-purpose 
ship is larger than necessary and too expensive for NNFM requirements.  Advanced guns 
                                                 
17 360–360 * 42.1% = 208.29. 
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are part of the modernization programs for DDG 51 class and CG 47 class ships to 
provide improved gunfire support.  CSBA proposed a gunship based on the frigate RSN 
Formidable (3200 tons) in a July 2009 “Green Water Navy 2029” war game.  A sample 
of 22 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, shown in Table 14, are used to develop a 
manpower estimate for NGFS (X). 
 
Type Country Ship Displacement Crew Size Aircrew # of helos
Cruiser Ukraine Slava 11490 476 N/A 1 
Cruiser U.S. Ticonderoga 9957 358 N/A 2 
Cruiser Russia Kara 9900 390 N/A 1 
Destroyer Japan Kongou 9485 300 N/A 1 
Destroyer U.S. DDG 51 8946 274 N/A 1 
Destroyer UK Daring 7450 191 N/A 1 
Destroyer France Forbin 7050 195 N/A 1 
Destroyer Italy Andrea Doria  6635 200 N/A 1 
Frigate Germany Baden-Württemberg 6800 110 N/A 2 
Frigate Spain Alvaro De Bazán  5853 200 N/A 1 
Frigate Germany Sachsen 5600 255 13 2 
Frigate UK BroadSword 4900 250 10 2 
Frigate Canada Halifax 4770 198 17 1 
Frigate UK Duke 4200 181 N/A 1 
Frigate U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry 4100 200 19 2 
Frigate China Type 054 3900 190 N/A 1 
Frigate France La Fayette 3750 153 N/A 1 
Frigate Turkey Barbaros 3380 187 9 1 
Frigate Greece Hydra 3350 199 13 1 
Frigate Italy Maestrale 3200 205 N/A 2 
Frigate Singapore Formidable 3200 71 15 1 
Frigate France Floreal 2950 90 11 1 
Frigate Italy Lupo 2525 177 N/A 1 
Frigate Poland Gawron II 2035 74 0 1 
Table 14.   Sample of 24 Ships for NGFS Ships 
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Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=24
























Figure 17.   NGFS Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
The regression, shown in Figure 17, produced an equation of y = 0.0288 * 
x + 51.186, where y is the estimate of crew size for a NFGS ship of x tons.  The adjusted 
R2 value is 0.6500 and the F-score significance is 1.195E-06.  Additional regression 
statistics can be found in Appendix D.  A crew size of 15218 is estimated for a midrange 
frigate sized NFGS ship of 3500 tons.  NFGS (X) will likely carry a helicopter or UAV 
for reconnaissance, so an aircrew of 10 is included. 
c. FMW (X) Fast Mine Warfare 
The NNFM calls for 12 Fast Mine Warfare ships.  High speed is crucial 
for strategic mobility, allowing these ships to arrive in theater in advance of the 
operation.  Fast and carrying UUV for sweeping operations, new technology may be 
needed in this case.  The LCS MIW module can serve as a prototype. 
A regression crew size versus displacement was performed on 28 MCM 
vessels.  The sample is provided in Table 15.  The result was statistically poor with an F-
score significance of 0.0106 and an adjusted R2 of 0.1959.  A regression of crew size 
versus speed likewise produced statistically poor results, with an F-score significance of 
0.3881 and adjusted R2 value of -0.0085.  The regression models are statistically no better 
than the average of the ships.  Additional regression statistics can be found in Appendix 
D.   
                                                 
18 y = 0.0288 * 3500 + 51.186 = 151.86. 
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Because speed is important for this class, the sample was reduced to only 
the ships with speeds of 17 knots or greater.  A regression of this sample still proves 
unhelpful, with an F-score significance of 0.3791 and an adjusted R2 value of -0.0118.  It 
is likely that the sample size of seven is just too small.  Instead, the average displacement, 
crew size, and speed are calculated.  The resultant composite ship is 500 tons, has a crew 
size of 36, and speed of 20 knots.  This is comparable to the fast mine warfare ship of 375 
tons, 40 crew members, and a speed of 20 knots proposed in CSBA’s July 2009 “Green 
Water Navy 2029” war game.  An estimate of 36 will be used for an FMW (X) that can 
travel at 20 knots. 
Country Ship Displacement Crew Size Speed 
Denmark Flyvefisken 480 29 30 
Norway Oskoy/Alta 375 40 23 
France Eridan 615 49 18 
Germany Ensdorf 635 34 18 
Germany Kulmbach 635 37 18 
Indonesia Kondor II 310 31 17 
Thailand Bang Rachan 444 33 17 
South Africa River 380 40 16 
Russia Natya I 804 67 16 
Canada Kingston 962 37 15 
Sweden Koster 360 29 15 
Greece Evropi 750 46 15 
Turkey Circe 460 48 15 
Sweden Landsort 360 29 15 
Korea Swallow 520 44 15 
Belgium KMV 644 27 15 
Montenegro Sirius 424 40 15 
Cuba Sonya 450 43 15 
Belgium Flower 650 46 15 
UK Hunt 740 45 15 
Pakistan Munsif 595 46 15 
Poland Mamry 216 27 14 
Japan Sugashima 590 45 14 
Australia Houn 720 40 14 
Italy Lerici 620 44 14 
Spain Segura 530 41 14 
Finland MCMV 2010 697 36 13 
Estonia Sandown 484 34 13 
 Avg: 551.79 39.54 16.04 
Table 15.   Sample of 36 Ships for Fast Mine Warfare 
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d. ASW (X) Anti-Submarine Warfare ship 
The Inshore Anti-Submarine Warfare ship is a special, single purpose 
ship, designed to operate in the littorals.  Twenty-six ships chosen ranging patrol craft, 
corvettes, frigates, and DDG were selected and are provided in Table 16.  Selected ships 
were required to have ASW capabilities listed in JFS.    
 
Type country Ship Displacement Crew Size ln(Disp) ln(Crew)
Corvette Sweden Goteborg 399 36 5.989 3.584
Patrol Forces Ukraine Pauk I 440 32 6.087 3.466
Patrol Forces Indonesia Singa 447 42 6.103 3.738
Patrol Forces Denmark Flyvefisken 480 29 6.174 3.367
Patrol Forces Singapore Fearless 500 32 6.215 3.466
Corvette Singapore Victory 595 49 6.389 3.892
Corvette Thailand Khanronsin 630 57 6.446 4.043
Patrol Forces Spain Serviola 1147 42 7.045 3.738
Corvette Isreal Sa’ar V 1295 64 7.166 4.159
Frigate France D’Estienne d’Orves 1330 90 7.193 4.500
Corvette Portugal Baptista de Andrade 1380 71 7.230 4.263
Corvette India Khukri 1423 112 7.261 4.718
Corvette Thailand Pattani 1440 78 7.272 4.357
Frigate Poland Gawron 2035 74 7.618 4.304
Frigate Turkey Tepe (Knox) 3011 288 8.010 5.663
LCS U.S. Freedom 3089 55 8.036 4.007
Frigate Portugal Vasco Da Gama 3300 182 8.102 5.204
Frigate Taiwan Kang Ding 3800 134 8.243 4.898
Frigate Taiwan Cheng Kung 4105 215 8.320 5.371
Frigate UK Duke 4200 181 8.343 5.198
Frigate Canada Halifax 4770 198 8.470 5.288
Frigate UK Broadsword 4900 250 8.497 5.521
Destroyer France Georges Leygues 4910 233 8.499 5.451
Frigate Norway Fridtjof Nansen 5290 120 8.574 4.787
Frigate Italy Bergamini 5950 145 8.691 4.977
Destroyer Japan Takani 6300 176 8.748 5.170
Destroyer U.S. Arleigh Burke 8946 274 9.099 5.613
Table 16.   Sample of 26 Ships for Inshore ASW Ship 
A regression on crew size versus displacement was performed.  The best 
fit line was a power series equation of y = 0.5783 * x^0.6747, where y is an estimate of 
crew size for an ASW ship of x tons.  Figure 18 shows the trend line. 
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Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=26




















Figure 18.   ASW Ship Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
A logarithmic transformation of the data was done to perform a linear 
regression of the model and obtain statistical analysis.  The resulting trend line shown in 
Figure 19 is y = 0.6747 * x – 0.5477, where y is the natural log of the crew size estimate 
and x is the natural log of displacement.  The F-score significance is 3.2852E-10 and the 
adjusted R2 is 0.7915.  Additional regression statistics can be found in Appendix D. 
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=26, ln-ln Transformation






















Figure 19.   ASW Ship Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage, ln-ln Transformation 
Because the ASW ship will be working in the littoral environment, a 
corvette sized model will likely suffice.  The Israeli Sa’ar with 1300 tons and 64 crew 
members was used as a model in the CSBA July 2009 “Green Water Navy 2029” war 
 58
game.  A crew size estimate of 7319 was developed using 1300 tons.  A ship of this size 
may have a small helicopter embarked, so an aircrew of 10 will also be included. 
e. IPC Inshore Patrol Craft 
The NNFM proposes 400 inshore patrol vessels to provide theater 
security.  The concept is to provide a flotilla of two squadrons as aide to selected friendly 
but poor nations to develop a coastal patrol fleet.  The squadrons would conduct anti-
piracy and counter-smuggling operations in coordination with host nation sailors.  It is 
assumed that approximately 2/3 of the ships will be manned and maintained by the 
foreign navy, with the U.S. in a supporting and training role.  Developing the inshore 
capability of the host nation is the primary goal.   
A squadron organization was developed after discussions with Captain B. 
S. Yates, USNR, Emerging Threats and Small Boats, Office of Naval Intelligence.  A 
Detachment is made up with one lead boat, manned by USN sailors, and two “under-
instruction” boats, manned by foreign sailors.  Four Detachments make up a Division, 
four Divisions make up a Squadron, two Squadrons make a Flotilla, and four Flotillas 
make up the Inshore Patrol Fleet.  One Squadron of 12 boats fully manned with USN 
sailors, is set aside for training and surge capability when needed.  The four remaining 
boats are held as reserve assets. 
The boats must be simple to operate and inexpensive, as they are likely to 
be given away as aide to the host country at end of their 5-year life-cycle.  Small inshore 
and riverine patrol craft were considered.  Crew sizes vary from two to as many as 12.  
Some suggested boats are the Special Operations Craft-Riverine, the Patrol Boat-River, 
the USCG Defender, and the Sea Ark Patrol Craft.  The Sea Ark was used with a crew 
size of 6 was used as a model to give most flexibility in estimation.  Personnel numbers 
are provided in Table 17.  See Appendix E for further details. 
 
 
                                                 
19y = 0.5783 * (1300)^0.6747 = 72.97. 
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Lead Boat  N/A 1 6 2 N/A 
Detachment  3 boats20 3 6 3 N/A 
Division 4 Detachments 12 24 12 17 
Squadron 4 Divisions 48 96 48 68 
Flotilla  2 Squadrons 96 192 96 136 
Fleet 4 Flotillas 384 768 384 544 
Training/Surge 1 Division 12 72 36 17 
Reserve 4 boats 4 N/A N/A N/A 
Table 17.   Inshore Patrol Organization 
The forward deployed or afloat manpower estimate for the 400 Inshore 
Patrol Fleet is 1821; 424 in each Flotilla for 1696 in the Fleet and 125 in the 
training/surge Division.  Approximately 4125 sailors and officers would be required, if 
the Inshore Patrol Fleet were manned entirely with USN personnel. 
f. OPV (X) Offshore Patrol Vessel 
The NNFM calls for 160 offshore patrol vessels.  With a planned cost 
limit of $60M, they are not likely to be very large or have a great number of capabilities.  
They are to be used for theater security, not combat operations.  There are a large range 
of vessels that can be described as offshore coastal ships.  A sample of 20 ships ranging 
between 90 to 2000 tons was selected and shown in Table 18. 
 
Country Name Displacement Crew Size Ln(Disp) Ln(Crew)
U.S. Marine Protector 91 10 4.51 2.30
Poland Pilica 93 14 4.53 2.64
U.S. Island 168 16 5.12 2.77
Barbados Damen Stan 205 14 5.32 2.64
France Thomson 227 7 5.42 1.95
India Bangaram 260 34 5.56 3.53
Australia Armidale 270 21 5.60 3.04
U.S. Sentinel FSC 353 22 5.87 3.09
                                                 
20 1 lead boat, 2 Under Instruction manned by host nation sailors. 
 60
U.S. Cyclone 354 39 5.87 3.66
Turkey Dearson 400 34 5.99 3.53
Lithuania Flyvefisken 480 29 6.17 3.37
Portugal LFC 2005 660 20 6.49 3.00
Taiwan Kinmen 688 38 6.53 3.64
Australia OPV 1100 44 7.00 3.78
India Vikram 1224 96 7.11 4.56
UK Castle 1427 45 7.26 3.81
Italy Comandante 1520 60 7.33 4.09
Taiwan Ho Hsing 1823 80 7.51 4.38
India Vishwast 1840 118 7.52 4.77
Spain Alboran 1963 37 7.58 3.61
Table 18.   Sample of 20 Ships for Offshore Patrol Vessels 
A regression on crew size versus displacement was completed.  The best 
fit line was a power series equation of y = 0.6205* x^0.6251, where y is an estimate of 
crew size for an offshore patrol craft of x tons.  Figure 20 shows the trend line. 
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=20




















Figure 20.   Offshore Patrol Craft Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
A logarithmic transformation of the data was done to perform a linear 
regression of the model and obtain statistical analysis.  The resulting trend line shown in 
Figure 21 is y = 0.6251 * x–0.4772, where y is the natural log of the crew size estimate 
and x is the natural log of displacement.  The F-score significance is 4.81E-06 and the 
adjusted R2 is 0.6792.  Additional regression statistics can be found in Appendix D. 
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Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=20, ln-ln transformation





















Figure 21.   OPC Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage, ln-ln Transformation 
The American Sentinel and Cyclone class vessels are promising, as well as 
the Turkish Dearson.  With that insight, the median of 440 tons was used in developing 
the crew size, an estimation of 2821.  A ship of this size will not have a helicopter 
detachment.   
g. CC (X) Coastal Combatant 
“The coastal combatant is not a patrol vessel for theater security 
operations.”  (NNFM, 2009, p. 20)  Coastal Combatants (CC) are small, fast, and lethal 
fighters.  They are heavily armed ships designed to clear a littoral area of enemy craft and 
coastal clutter.  These ships will see action and losses should be expected.  These ships 
must be “small enough to accept affordable losses.”  (NNFM, 2009, p. 21)  Likewise, 
crews must also be small.  As before, many examples can be found in foreign fleets.  
China’s Houbei and Norway’s Skjold both appear to be excellent candidates.  The 
estimate will be based on the average displacement (384 tons) of the ships to avoid 
underestimating the crew size.  Only small, fast, heavily armed vessels were included in 
the sample provided in Table 19. 
 
 
                                                 
21y = 0.6205* (440)^0.6251 = 27.87 
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Country Name Displacement Crew Size 
China Houbei 220 12 
Finland Hamina 270 29 
Sweden Visby 620 43 
Greece Super Vita 660 45 
Singapore Fearless 500 32 
Norway Skjold 273 20 
Russia Svetlyak 375 36 
Pakistan Kaan 33 120 18 
Denmark Flyvefisken 480 24 
Egypt Ambassador III 550 36 
Denmark Willemoes 260 25 
Israel Aliya 498 53 
Sweden Kaparen 170 22 
Table 19.   Sample of 13 Ships for Coastal Combatants 
The regression produces an equation of y = .0531 * x + 9.9606, where y is 
the estimate crew size for a CC of x tons.  The F-score significance is 0.0012 and the 
adjusted R2 value is 0.5982.  Additional regression statistics can be found in Appendix 
D. 
Using a displacement of 385 tons, crew size for a CC is estimated at 3022.  
This is comparable to Finland’s Hamina, the basis of the proposed CC in CSBA’s July 
2009 war game, “Green Water Navy 2029.” 
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement



















Figure 22.   CC Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
                                                 
22 y = .0531 * 384 + 9.9606 = 30.35. 
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h. CC Tender 
The NNFM Coastal Combatants are designed for “short range, short 
duration sorties.”  (NNFM, 2009, p. 21)  Two tenders are listed in the NNFM to provide 
logistical support for up to ten CCs when they cannot be supported ashore.  LT B. 
Christiansen proposed a simplified variant of the San Antonio class LPD in his thesis: 
Littoral Combat Vessels: Analysis and Comparison of Designs23.   
The advantages of using this concept is that it utilizes an existing hull with 
air support capability (for the inclusion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or 
UAVs, to improve scouting and helicopters for personnel recovery) and is 
already designed to support a large number of personnel in addition to the 
organic crew as well as interface with smaller seaborne vessels.  
(Christiansen, 2008, p. 17) 
The previous developed LPD 17 ship’s crew of 360 and aircrew of 35 will 
be used to estimate manpower requirements for the CC tender. 
4. Submarines 
The NNFM speculates that a fleet of 80 attack submarines might be needed at the 
outset of hostilities with a peer maritime nation.  It argues that an all-SSN fleet of such 
numbers would be difficult to afford.  The NNFM further argues that Air-Independent 
Propulsion (AIP) submarines have their advantages and at a much more affordable price.  
The submarine force of the NNFM is 40 SSNs, 40 AIP diesel SSKs, and 9 SSBNs.  The 
30 planned Virginia class submarines will provide the bulk of the nuclear fast attack subs, 
while the 3 Seawolf and 7 Los Angeles class submarines will round out the fleet at 40 
SSNs.  The 40 AIP diesel submarines would be developed from foreign examples. 
Little information on SSN (X) and SSBN (X) programs is available.  They will 
not be included in this work.  It is assumed that the total number of submarines would 
remain constant and any “X” submarine will likely have manpower requirements similar 
to its predecessor. 
                                                 
23 NPS Master’s Thesis: “Littoral Combat Vessels: Analysis and Comparison of Designs” by Brian J. 
Christiansen, LT, USN, Sept 2008. 
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a. SSN 688 Fast Attack Submarine (Los Angeles) 
The JFS number of 134 will be used as the estimate for SSN 688.  This 
provides consistency when comparing crew sizes to foreign submarines.  SMD data 
differs from JFS. 
b. SSN 21 Fast Attack Submarine (Seawolf) 
JFS numbers of 140 will be used to provide consistency with foreign 
submarines.  SMD data differs from JFS. 
c. SSN 774 Fast Attack Submarine (Virginia) 
Ship’s crew of 134 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 774 SMD data was 
not available at the time of this study. 
d. SSK (X) AIP Diesel Submarine                
AIP submarines are attractive because they offer “an underwater 
endurance far in excess of the average diesel-electric submarine” (De Lionis, 1998) at a 
much more affordable cost than nuclear power.  AIP propulsion can allow submarines “to 
cruise submerged at low speed for over two weeks.” (Scott, 1999)  While obviously not 
equivalent to a nuclear-powered sub, the extended endurance and larger potential 
quantities can provide tactical options to the fleet. 
Similar to other proposed ships in the NNFM, AIP Submarines are not 
part the modern U.S. naval fleet, but there are many foreign examples to use as models. 
Sixteen submarines within the displacement/capability range were selected, as shown in 
Table 20. 
 
Country Submarine Displacement Crew Size 
Greece Type 209 1285 38 
Sweden Gotland A17 1599 27 
Sweden Sodermanland 1600 27 
Malaysia Scorpene 1758 31 
Spain Agosta 90B 1760 36 
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Germany Type 212A 1830 28 
Turkey Type 214 1860 27 
China Song 2250 60 
Russia Lada Project 677 2650 37 
France Rubis SSN 2670 68 
Japan Harushio SS583 3200 75 
Japan Oyashio SS90 3500 70 
Japan Soryu 4200 65 
U.S. LA SSN688 7011 134 
UK Astute SSN 7400 140 
U.S. Virginia SSN 7800 134 
Table 20.   Sample of 16 Submarines for AIP Submarines 
The regression shown in Figure 23 produced an equation of y = 0.0177 * x 
+ 4.2705, where y is the estimate of crew size for an AIP submarine of x tons.  The 
adjusted R2 value is 0.9285 and the F-score significance is 1.2710E-09.  Additional 
regression statistics can be found in Appendix D.  The average tonnage of the 12 non-
nuclear submarines in the sample was used to develop the crew size estimate.  A crew 
size of 4524 will be used for an AIP submarine of 2300 tons. 
Crew Size as a Function of Displacement
n=16






















Figure 23.   AIP submarine Crew Size as a Function of Tonnage 
There was concern that, like the aircraft carriers analysis, the larger U.S. 
SSNs may be influencing outliers.  A regression was performed without the three SSNs 
                                                 
24 y = 0.0177 * 2300 + 4.2705 = 44.98. 
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for a comparison.  The resulting line, y = 0.0176 * x + 4.497 with an adjusted R2 value of 
0.6210, provides nearly identical estimates, validating the previous regression.  
e. SSBN 730 Strategic Missile Submarines 
Ship’s crew of 155 was taken directly from JFS.  SSN 730 SMD has a 
ship’s crew of 159. 
f. AS 39 Submarine Tender 
Ship’s crew of 1268 was taken directly from JFS. 
5. Delivery and Sustainment Ships 
The delivery of small vessels to distant theaters and their sustainment is a concern 
in the NNFM.  It fills this requirement with 125 “Deliver and Sustain” sealift ships of the 
MSC.  NNFM distinguishes “between sealift ships for delivery and sustainment from 
ships for amphibious lift and preposition.” (NNFM, 2009, p 41)  The NNFM strategy 
excludes amphibious assault so “Delivery and sustainment ships are not expected to be 
attacked.” (NNFM, 2009, p 41)   
The Deliver and Sustain component will be composed of Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), 
Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off ship (LMSR), High Speed Vessels, and a variety 
of other Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships of the MSC.  Large supply/support ships like 
these do not generally have the displacement/crew relationship that warships exhibit. 
FSS can be ready to load cargo and get underway within 96 hours.  It has “large 
open bay interiors and roll-on/roll-off ramps—make them particularly well suited for the 
transport of tanks, helicopters and other military vehicles and supplies.”  (“Fast Sealift 
Ships—Fact Sheet,” 2003)  These ships have a crew size of 42 MSC civilians and may 
have an additional 12 USAR cargo handlers.  “LMSRs can carry an entire U.S. Army 
Task Force, including 58 tanks, 48 other tracked vehicles, plus more than 900 trucks and 
other wheeled vehicles.”  (“Large, Medium-speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships T-AKR,” 
2009)  The ships can support humanitarian missions as well.  LMSRs normally have a 
crew size of 26 to 45 civilians and up to 50 USN sailors.  Twenty-five of these ships (10 
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FSS and 15 LMSR) will be kept activated or dedicated to prepositioning, and manned at 
military levels.  Military manning for these ships will be estimated at four times the 
normal civilian crew plus NSE and SBE25 crew for cargo handling and vertical lift (as 
previously identified for similar MPF(F) ships).   
“The RRF includes fast sealift ships, roll-on/roll-off ships, lighter aboard ships, 
modular cargo delivery system ships, heavy lift ships, crane ships and government-owned 
tankers.”  (“Ready Reserve Force Ships,” 2008)  Most of the RRF ships are normally 
kept in a Reduced Operating Status (ROS)26 but can be fully activated to Full Operating 
Status (FOS) within 96 hours.  To develop conservative MSC crew sizes, 50% of the 
ships will be estimated with an average FOS and the other 50% estimated at ROS.   
Crew sizes will be estimated, as shown in Table 21. 
Ship Example Civilian USN Aircrew27 USN Ship Crew 
FSS T-AKR 287 0 10 23328 
LMSR T-AKR 300 0 205 29029 
RRF (FOS) 30 Various 32 0 2 
RRF (ROS) Various 9 0 0 
JHSV Jervis Bay 20 0 0 
Table 21.   Deliver and Sustain MSC ships 
6. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force  
The numbers and costs of these ships in the NNFM are unchanged from the 313 
ship plan.  Refer to the equivalent section in the 313 Ship Navy section above for detailed 
discussion. 
                                                 
25 Reminder: The Navy Support Element (NSE) is a detachment of active duty USN cargo handlers 
who conduct the off-load and ship-to-shore movement of equipment and supplies.   
The Sea Base Echelon (SBE) typically consists of the assault echelon’s support crews providing 
support by vertical replenishment.  SBE numbers are assumed to be part of the aircrew. 
26 Ships in ROS have a small crew onboard to assure the readiness of propulsion and other primary 
systems if the need arises to activate the ship. (www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/glossary.htm). 
27 Equivalent to SBE 
28 4 * 43 (civ crew) + 61 (NSE). 
29 4 * 45 (civ crew) + 110 (NSE). 
30 Average of the 50 RRF MSC ships at FOS and ROS, see RRF ship data. 
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a. T-AO, T-AOE, T-AKE, ARS, T-AGOS, and T-ATF 
T-AO(X), T-AOE(X), ARS(X), and T-ATF(X) are the next generation 
NFAF ships.  Focus of improvement will likely be on cargo handling and capacity.  
Large MSC supply/support ships do not generally have the displacement/crew 
relationship that warships exhibit.  Current numbers of equivalent current ships, provided 
in Table 22 should suffice. 
 
Class Type Civilian Crew Military Crew Aircraft Aircrew
T-AO (X)  Oiler 89 5 N/A 0 
T-AOE (X)  Fast Combat Support 160 28 2 MH-60 19 
T-AKE 1  Cargo and Ammo 113 11 2 MH-60 19 
T-ARS (X)  Salvage ship 26 4 N/A 0 
TAGOS 23 Ocean Surveillance 26 16 N/A 0 
T-ATF (X)  Fleet Ocean Tug 16 4 N/A 0 
Table 22.   Future Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 
b. JHSV High Speed Connector  
Manning of these high-speed intra-theater surface connectors should be 
similar to the WestPac Express or the Jervis Bay.  For this study, the JHSV crew will be 
estimated with Jervis Bay’s complement of 20 (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2009). 
c. JCC(X) Command Ship 
Naval command ships provide communications, coordinate activities, and 
serve as the flagships of Fleet Commanders.  Two new LPD 17 ships, configured as 
command ships, may be commissioned to replace LCC 19 and 20.  Crew size has been 
sharply reduced by manpower efficiencies.  It is unlikely that manpower will be reduced 
much more for JCC(X).  Current crew sizes of 146 civilian and 157 sailor requirements 
for LCC20 will be used to estimate JCC(X).  An aircrew of 10 for 1 SH-3H Sea King will 
also be included.  This study does not include the varying command staff embarked. 
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CVN 78 Aircraft Carrier  6 0 1960 2700 0 11760 16200 27960
CVL (X)  18 0 420 940 0 7560 16920 24480
                  
DDG 51 Destroyer 27 0 10 276 0 270 7452 7722
DDG 1000 3 0 19 125 0 57 375 432
FF (X) Frigate  90 0 19 140 0 1710 12600 14310
LA (X) Land attack (missiles)  20 0 0 76 0 0 1520 1520
DDG 51 BMD 7 0 10 276 0 70 1932 2002
DDG (X)  2 0 19 145 0 38 290 328
                  
Global Fleet Station Ships 12 104 38 104 1248 456 1248 2952
NGFS (X) Gunfire support  12 0 10 152 0 120 1824 1944
FMW (X) Fast MIW 12 0 0 36 0 0 432 432
ASW (X) Anti-submarine ship 12 0 10 73 0 120 876 996
Inshore patrol (# per div of 12 
boats) 400 0 0 53 0 0 1821 1821
OPV (X) Offshore patrol 160 0 0 28 0 0 4480 4480
CC (X) Coastal Combatant 30 0 0 30 0 0 900 900
CC Tender  2 0 35 360 0 70 720 790
                  
SSN 688 Fast attack submarine 
(LA) 7 0 0 134 0 0 938 938
SSN 21 Fast attack submarine 
(Seawolf) 3 0 0 140 0 0 420 420
SSN 774 Fast attack submarine 
(Virginia) 30 0 0 134 0 0 4020 4020
SSK (X) AIP Submarine 40 0 0 45 0 0 1800 1800
SSBN 730 Strategic missile 
submarines 9 0 0 155 0 0 1395 1395
AS 39 Sub tenders  2 0 0 1268 0 0 2536 2536
                  
T-AKR 287 Deliver/Sustain Fast 
Sealift 10 0 100 233 0 0 2430 2430
T-AKR 300 Deliver/Sustain 
LMSR 15 0 205 290 0 0 7425 7425
RRF Deliver/Sustain (FOS) 45 32 0 2 1440 0 90 1530
RRF Deliver/Sustain (ROS) 45 9 0 0 405 0 0 405
JHSV Deliver/Sustain 10 20 0 0 200 0 0 200
                  
T-AO (X)  15 89 0 5 1335 0 75 1410
T-AOE (X) 4 160 19 28 640 76 112 828
T-AKE 1 Cargo and Ammo  11 113 19 11 1243 209 121 1573
ARS (X) 4 26 0 4 104 0 16 120
T-AGOS 23 Ocean surveillance 
ship 5 26 0 16 130 0 80 210
T-ATF (X) 4 16 0 4 64 0 16 80
JHSV 3 0 0 20 0 0 60 60
JCC (X) 2 146 10 157 292 20 318 630
  677       7101 25954 88263 121318
Table 23.   Model of Proposed New Navy Fighting Machine Manpower 
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. MAIN RESULTS 
Detailed results of the manpower estimates can be found at the conclusion of each 
analysis section, on pages 28, 40, and 69.  The results are summarized below.  Although 
these results must be regarded as preliminary, they are as thorough as the data and 
statistical analysis appear to justify.  More detailed discussions follow.  












Current Ship Inventory 280 3953 34930 95825 134708 
313 Ship Navy 313 5272 41158 84380 130810 
New Navy Fighting 
Machine 677 7101 25954 88263 121318 
Table 24.   Final Manpower Estimates 
B. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
The “New Navy Fighting Machine” impression was that manning 650 ships 
would be about the same as for the 313 Ship Navy.  The conjecture was actually 
incorrect.  Even with its final number increasing to 677 ships and 400 inshore patrol craft, 
the manpower required is actually smaller, by approximately 9500 less billets.   
By introducing many smaller, more focused vessels instead of large multi-
missions ships, manpower requirements were decreased from 130,810 to 121,318, 7% 
less than the 313 ship plan.  In addition, the NNFM also appears to be more evenly 
distributed among its missions.  Fifty-six percent of its total afloat manpower is 
designated to blue water missions, 21% are allocated to green water vessels, and 7% to 
the submarine force.  The shift from 11 CVNs for 6 CVNs and 18 CVLs produced the 
largest shift in manpower utilization, transferring nearly 9% of the manpower from a blue 
to green water focus.  
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“Secretary Robert M. Gates cited the value of developing a viable force of small 
warships that are better suited to face current threats in the littorals than vessels designed 
for blue-water operations.” (McLeary, 2009)  With regards to manpower, the NNFM 
appears to succeed in achieving the former while sustaining the strength of the latter. 
C. OTHER RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Table 25 summarizes the distribution of ships and manpower:  
  Current Inventory 313 Ship Navy Plan NNFM Plan31 
  Ships Manpower Ships Manpower Ships Manpower 
Aircraft 
Carriers 11 4% 62630 46% 11 4% 56360 43% 24 4% 52440 43%
Blue Water32  104 37% 29082 22% 88 28% 19316 15% 149 22% 26557 22%
Green Water33 23 8% 1552 1% 55 18% 3520 3% 240 35% 14315 12%
Submarines 71 25% 9910 7% 66 21% 9240 7% 89 13% 8573 7%
Amphib., 
Delivery, and 
Sustainment34 32 11% 24398 18% 43 14% 34931 27% 125 18% 11990 10%
Support Ships 39 14% 7136 5% 50 16% 7443 6% 50 7% 7443 6%
 Totals 280   134708   313   130810   677   121318   
Table 25.   Ship and Manpower Distribution 
1. NNFM Resources are More Widely Distributed 
Of particular interest for the baseline results is that the 11 aircraft carriers (4% of 
the Navy’s warships) constitute 46.5% of the manpower afloat.  The fleet has a focus on 
blue water operations with 68% of its afloat manpower on aircraft carriers, cruisers, 
destroyers, and frigates.  Only 1.2% of its manpower is dedicated to green water 
operations. 
                                                 
31 The 18 CVLs are dual-capable for both blue and green water operations, depending on airwing 
configuration.  The NNFM study assigns 8 CVLs (contains 9% of the total afloat manpower) to the green 
water fleet.  
32 Including Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates, and/or Corvettes. 
33 Including Theater Security Craft and Coastal Combatant Vessels. 
34 Including prepositioning ships. 
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The proposed 313 ship fleet remains dominated by aircraft carriers, with 43% of 
the manpower on the 11 ships.  It also remains blue water centric with nearly 58% of the 
manpower afloat aboard aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.  Although the number 
of littoral ships increased from 8% to 18%, the amount of manpower dedicated to the 
green water and littoral operations vital to the Navy’s new strategic mission is still low at 
3%.  This limits the influential impact that the U.S. Navy might gain through combined 
operations with foreign countries.  
Manpower in the NNFM is more widely distributed throughout the Navy’s 
missions.  There is still a large percent of manpower (43%) aboard aircraft carriers, 
although there are now 24 of them.  Sixteen of the carriers with only 34% of the total 
manpower afloat are allocated for blue water operations.  The total number of manpower 
required aboard the 165 blue water ships decreased slightly to 56%.  The remaining eight 
light carriers are allotted to the green water mission.  With a total of 248 ships and 400 
inshore patrol craft, the green water manpower forces increased dramatically, from 1.2% 
in the current inventory and 3% in the 313 Ship Navy design, to 21% in the NNFM.  This 
mix provides a viable presence in the littorals to conduct green water operations, perform 
humanitarian assistance, and provide training to local naval forces, as required in the 
Navy’s new maritime strategy, while maintaining a credible blue water component. 
2. The Impact of AIP Submarines will be Significant 
The percentage of manpower dedicated to submarines remains nearly the same for 
all three fleet arrangements, but the total number of submarines and submariners differs.  
It can be noted that there is a decrease in submarines from 71 in the current inventory to 
66 in the 313 ship plan.  This is in stark contrast to the 89 submarines in the NNFM.  
Interestingly, the manpower numbers actually reduce from 9,910 submariners in the 
current fleet and 9,240 in the 313 ship plan to 8,573 submariners in the NNFM.  The low 
cost and small crews of the AIP diesel submarines in the NNFM make the higher number 
of submarines possible.  This is significant as recruiting and training cost are typically 
higher in the nuclear submarine community.  While quality sailors will still be required to 
operate AIP diesel submarines, training methods and other resources are likely to be quite 
different. 
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3. Technology Will Likely Affect Manpower Needs 
Automation and other technological improvements are expected to be future 
advantages in reducing the crew size per displacement ton without affecting combat 
effectiveness.  Reduction by automation has proven to be successful in some foreign 
ships, commercial ocean liners, and civilian-manned MSC ships.  Although the 313 Ship 
Navy has more ships (an increase of approximately 12%), the afloat manpower 
requirements decreased to 130,810 (a decrease of nearly 3%).  This reduction is credible 
assuming current technological advances and optimal manning initiatives successfully 
shape future crew sizes as proposed and that manpower saving technology will continue 
to evolve. 
The result of the NNFM is an even lower manpower requirement of 121,318 (a 
reduction of 7% from the 313 Ship Navy and nearly 10% less than the Current Fleet 
Inventory) for even more ships (116% more ships than 313 and 141% more than the 
current inventory).  Crew sizes for the three warships in common (CVN 78, DDG 1000, 
and DDG(X)) between the 313 Ship Navy and the NNFM were consistent, therefore, any 
crew reductions assumed in the 313 ship plan would likewise reduce NNFM crew 
estimates.  In general, however, technology induced manpower reductions were not 
assumed as a driving factor in crew size estimation.  Instead, only U.S. and foreign navy 
ships currently available or near completion were taken into consideration.  Hence, if 
manpower reductions are successful, it is likely that the NNFM manpower requirements 
will be even smaller. 
4. Displacement Relationships are Helpful, but Cannot Estimate 
Everything 
Sound projections of manpower for warships appear to fit a linear relationship 
between displacement and manpower.  In a sample of 149 warships, displacement was 
found to be a statistically significant factor for determining crew size.  As was shown in 
the analysis, estimations could be developed with some degree of statistical significance.  
However, there were some ship types in which displacement was not a key factor in 
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estimating crew size, such as the inshore patrol craft squadrons, mine warfare ships, and 
support, prepositioning, and delivery/sustainment ships. 
There does appear to be a relationship between displacement and crew size even 
for small craft such as the Sea Ark SOCR, and PBR MkII.  However, the USN manpower 
requirements for such patrol craft squadrons were to be developed with training and 
development of foreign forces in mind.  In this case, subject matter experts can be of 
assistance in developing new or undeveloped ideas.  The newly formed Maritime 
Expeditionary Security Force of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command may point 
the way.  (http://www.necc.navy.mil/) 
The mine warfare ships were not described well by a relationship between crew 
size and displacement.  Whether crew size did in fact have a relationship with 
displacement or some other ship characteristic was outside the focus of this work.  That 
the relationship was not easily discernable was more important.  In such cases, just taking 
an average may have to suffice.   
Combat logistics/support, prepositioning, and delivery/sustainment ships do not 
demonstrate the crew size versus displacement relationship either.  Crew operations and 
management on these ships are considerably different as are the watch standing and 
training requirements.  As such, these large support ships require substantially less 
manpower per displacement ton.  Both the 313 Ship Navy and the NNFM plans introduce 
new seabasing, prepositioning, and delivery/sustainment concepts.  Significant resources 
and personnel are dedicated to these areas.  Without the displacement relationship to rely 
on, estimation of manpower was much less well-defined. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis compared the manpower requirements for three U.S. Navy fleet 
compositions: the current fleet, the projected 313 ship plan, and the proposed NNFM.  
Although only exploratory, it showed that a fleet with smaller, more focused, yet more 
numerous vessels could capably provide a more distributed manpower structure at 
appreciably lower numbers.  Several areas could benefit from further research to examine 
the manpower challenges involved, if a bimodal fleet of the sort proposed by the NNFM 
is developed. 
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1. Further Validation of Estimates 
The crew size estimates for the NNFM were largely developed from regressions 
performed on samples of ships with similar sizes and capabilities.  Because of its 
exploratory nature, this study did not delve into some statistical details.  Sensitivity 
analysis could be done to investigate the robustness of the study.  Multi-variable 
regressions could also be examined.  How does armament or propulsion affect manpower 
requirements?  A multi-variable regression with the year of commission may provide 
additional insight to how future crew sizes might decrease over time, as Figure 5 and 
Figure 8 imply. 
2. Alternative Manpower Estimation Methods 
An alternative method might build up a desired vessel based on size, armament, 
propulsion, flight deck, etc.  Each characteristic could be matched to a current U.S. ship 
with that particular capability.  Different ship “parts” could be combined to create a 
completely new vessel.  Section V of that ship’s SMD provides the functional workload 
for that class of ship.  The functional workloads, adjusted up or down to better match 
desired size and capabilities, could then serve as building blocks for total manpower 
estimation. 
3. New Ratings/Designators and Training? 
With a more distributed manpower structure with personnel aboard more focused 
vessels, a study of the relationship between ship mission and training may be fruitful.   
The large increase in the green water component will surely create challenges 
along with the opportunities.  A dedicated organization may be needed to for theater 
security and coastal combat operations.  New ratings and designators may even be 
required.  Manpower distribution, training, and support should be studied. 
In addition, manning adjustments will be made as the proposed fleet moves from 
CVN focused operations to more CVL missions.  Increased UAV operations seem a 
natural fit for the CVL.  This in turn could greatly affect naval aviation manpower 
requirements, as well as answering the question of whether a new UAV rating might be 
desirable. 
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Finally, the impact of AIP diesel submarines on recruiting, training, and 
developing submariners should be considered.  It is believed that ships and submarines 
with nuclear power require more training.  Training resources and methods should be 
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APPENDICES 
A. SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS TERMS 
Taken from NPS Cost Estimation Course Notes, with permission from Dr. D. A. 
Nussbaum, Professor, NPS 
 
Standard Error: the standard deviation about the regression line.  (The smaller the 
better.)  This means that on “average” when predicting future values, they will be off by 
that much 
Eqn:  




Coefficient of Variation (CV): On “average,” the prediction will be off by this much 





Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Measures of Variation: 
SST = SSE + SSR 
“total” = “unexplained” + “explained” 
 







Residual or Error Sum of Squares (SSE):  The sum of the squared deviations between 







Regression Sum of Squares (SSR): The sum of the squared deviations between the 
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Coefficient of Determination: 
Coefficient of Determination (R2) represents the percentage of total variation explained 




R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom (Adj. R2) takes into account the increased uncertainty 






The F Statistic: 
• The F statistic tells us whether the full model is preferred to the mean.   
 
• If the F value falls within the rejection region, we reject the null hypothesis (that the 
coefficients of all the independent variables are zero) and say the full model is better 
than the mean as a predictor. 
 
Significance of F:  If less than a then we prefer the model to the mean. 
 
The t statistic: 
• For a regression coefficient, the determination of statistical significance is based on a 
t test 
o The test depends on the ratio of the coefficient’s estimated value to its standard 
deviation, called a t statistic 
• This statistic tests the strength of the relationship between Y and X (or between Crew 
Size and Displacement) by testing the strength of the coefficient. 
• Another way of looking at this is that the t-statistic tells us how many standard 
deviations the coefficient is from zero. 
• The t-statistic is used to test the hypothesis that X and Y (or Displacement and Crew 
Size) are NOT related at a given level of significance. 
• If the test indicates that that X and Y are related, then we say we prefer the model 
with b1 to the model without b1. 
 
For a single variable regression as is performed in this work, the t and F test results are 
the same. 
     α 


















• CV: The smaller the better. 
• R2 or Adj. R2:  The bigger the better. 
• Significance of F: If less than α then we prefer the model to the mean 
• P-value of coefficient b1: If less than α, then we prefer the model with b1, else we 
prefer it without b1. 
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B. SHIP AND USN/USMC AFLOAT PERSONNEL LEVELS  
Ship and USN/USMC Afloat Personnel levels 


































                                                 
35 Data taken from http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#1993. 
36 Data taken from http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm. 
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C. SAMPLE OF 149 WARSHIPS 
Foreign and U.S. Navy Warship Data 
  Type Country Ship 
Disp. 
(Tons) Crew Aircrew 
# 
Aircraft
1 Aircraft Carrier USA Gerald R Ford 100000 2700 1960 75
2 Aircraft Carrier USA Nimitz 91,487 3200 2480 52
3 Aircraft Carrier USA Enterprise 89,600 3350 2480 52
4 Aircraft Carrier USA Kitty Hawk 83960 2930 N/A 52
5 Aircraft Carrier Russia Kuznetsov 45900 1960 626 22
6 Aircraft Carrier France Charkes De Gaulle 42500 1256 610 30
7 Aircraft Carrier India Vikrant 37500 1400 N/A 12
8 Aircraft Carrier France Clemenceau 32,780 1017 358 20
9 Aircraft Carrier Italy Cavour 27,100 528 168 20
10 Aircraft Carrier Italy  Cavour 27,100 528 168 20
11 Aircraft Carrier Spain  Juan Carlos I 27079 243 172 20
12 Aircraft Carrier UK Illustrious 20600 685 366 24
13 Aircraft Carrier Spain 
Prinipe De 
Asturias 17188 555 201 13
14 Aircraft Carrier Italy Garibaldi 13850 582 230 15
15 Aircraft Carrier Thailand Chakri Naruebet 11485 455 146 12
16 LHA USA America (LHA-6) 44850 1059 N/A 23
17 LHD USA Wasp 40,650 1123 N/A 20
18 LSD USA Whidbey Island 16,740 413 N/A 2
19 Cruiser Ukraine Slava 11,490 476 N/A 1
20 Cruiser USA Ticonderoga 9,957 358 N/A 2
21 Cruiser Russia Kara 9,900 390 N/A 1
22 Destroyer Japan Kongou 9,485 300 N/A 1
23 Destroyer USA Arleigh Burke 8946 274 0 1
24 Destroyer UK Daring 7450 191 0 1
25 Destroyer France Forbin 7050 195 0 1
26 Destroyer Italy Andrea Doria  6635 200 0 1
27 Destroyer Japan  Takani 6300 176 N/A N/A
28 Destroyer France  Georges Leygues 4910 233 N/A 2
29 Frigate Germany 
Baden-
Württemberg  6800 110 0 2
30 Frigate Italy  Bergamini 5950 145 N/A 2
31 Frigate Spain Alvaro De Bazán  5853 200 0 1
32 Frigate Germany Sachsen 5600 255 13 2
33 Frigate Norway  Fridtjof Nansen 5290 120 N/A 1
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34 Frigate UK BroadSword 4900 250 10 2
35 Frigate Canada Halifax 4770 198 17 1
36 Frigate UK Duke 4200 181 N/A 1
37 Frigate Taiwan  Cheng Kung 4105 215 19 2
38 Frigate USA 
Oliver Hazard 
Perry 4100 200 19 2
39 Frigate China Type 054 3900 190 N/A 1
40 Frigate Taiwan  Kang Ding 3800 134 N/A 1
41 Frigate France La Fayette 3750 153 N/A 1
42 Frigate Turkey Barbaros 3380 187 9 1
43 Frigate Greece Hydra 3350 199 13 1
44 Frigate Portugal  Vasco Da Gama 3300 182 16 2
45 Frigate Italy Maestrale 3200 205 N/A 2
46 Frigate Singapore Formidable 3200 71 15 1
47 Frigate Turkey  Tepe (Knox) 3011 288 N/A 1
48 Frigate France Floreal 2950 90 11 1
49 Frigate Italy Lupo 2525 177 N/A 1
50 Frigate Poland Gawron II 2035 74 0 1
51 Frigate Japan Ishikari/Yuubari  1,690 95 0 0
52 Frigate Iran Moudge 1400 130 0 0
53 Frigate Iran Alvand 1350 125 0 0
54 Frigate France Destienne dOrves 1330 90 0 0
55 LCS U.S. Freedom 3089 50 N/A 2
56 Corvette Turkey Milgem 2000 93 0 1
57 Corvette Germany Braunschweig 1840 58 0 1
58 Corvette Malaysia Kedah 1650 68 0 1
59 Corvette India Kora 1460 134 0 1
60 Corvette Thailand  Pattani 1440 78 0 0
61 Corvette India  Khukri 1423 112 0 0
62 Corvette Portugal  
Baptista de 
Andrade 1380 71 0 0
63 Corvette Isreal Sa’ar V 1295 64 0 0
64 Corvette Thailand  Khanronsin 630 57 0 0
65 Corvette Sweden Visby 620 43 0 1
66 Corvette Singapore  Victory 595 49 0 0
67 Corvette Sweden  Goteborg  399 36 0 0
68 MCM Canada  Kingston  962 37 0 0
69 MCM Russia  Natya I 804 67 0 0
70 MCM Greece  Evropi 750 46 0 0
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71 MCM UK  Hunt 740 45 0 0
72 MCM Australia  Houn 720 40 0 0
73 MCM Finland  MCMV 2010 697 36 0 0
74 MCM Taiwan  Kinmen 688 38 0 0
75 MCM Portugal  LFC 2005 660 20 0 0
76 MCM Belgium  Flower 650 46 0 0
77 MCM Belgium  KMV 644 27 0 0
78 MCM Germany Ensdorf 635 34 0 0
79 MCM Germany Kulmbach 635 37 0 0
80 MCM Italy  Lerici 620 44 0 0
81 MCM France Eridan 615 49 0 0
82 MCM Pakistan  Munsif 595 46 0 0
83 MCM Japan  Sugashima 590 45 0 0
84 MCM Spain  Segura  530 41 0 0
85 MCM Estonia  Sandown 484 34 0 0
86 MCM Turkey  Circe 460 48 0 0
87 MCM Cuba  Sonya 450 43 0 0
88 MCM Thailand  Bang Rachan 444 33 0 0
89 MCM Montenegro Sirius 424 40 0 0
90 MCM Norway Oskoy/Alta 375 40 0 0
91 MCM Sweden  Koster 360 29 0 0
92 MCM Sweden  Landsort 360 29 0 0
93 MCM Indonesia Kondor II 310 31 0 0
94 MCM Poland  Mamry 216 27 0 0
95 PC-Missile Greece Super Vita 660 45 0 0
96 PC-Missile Singapore Fearless 500 32 0 0
97 PC-Missile Norway Skjold 273 20 0 0
98 PC-Missile Finland Hamina 270 29 0 0
99 PC-Missile China Houbei 220 12 0 0
100 PC-Missile Sweden  Kaparen 170 22 0 0
101 Patrol Craft Spain  Alboran 1963 37 0 0
102 Patrol Craft India  Vishwast 1840 118 0 1
103 Patrol Craft Taiwan  Ho Hsing 1823 80 0 0
104 Patrol Craft Italy  Comandante 1520 60 N/A 1
105 Patrol Craft UK  Castle 1427 45 0 0
106 Patrol Craft India  Vikram 1224 96 N/A 1
107 Patrol Craft Spain  Serviola 1147 42 0 0
108 Patrol Craft Australia  OPV 1100 44 0 0
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109 Patrol Craft Egypt  Ambassador III 550 36 0 0
110 Patrol Craft Korea  Swallow 520 44 0 0
111 Patrol Craft Israel  Aliya 498 53 0 0
112 Patrol Craft Lithuania Flyvefisken 480 29 0 0
113 Patrol Craft Indonesia  Singa 447 42 0 0
114 Patrol Craft Ukraine  Pauk I 440 32 0 0
115 Patrol Craft Turkey  Dearson 400 34 0 0
116 Patrol Craft South Africa River 380 40 0 0
117 Patrol Craft Russia  Svetlyak 375 36 0 0
118 Patrol Craft USA Cyclone 354 39 0 0
119 Patrol Craft USA Sentinel FSC 353 22 0 0
120 Patrol Craft Australia Armidale 270 21 0 0
121 Patrol Craft India Bangaram 260 34 0 0
122 Patrol Craft Denmark  Willemoes 260 25 0 0
123 Patrol Craft France  Thomson 227 7 0 0
124 Patrol Craft Barbados  Damen Stan 205 14 0 0
125 Patrol Craft USA Island 168 16 0 0
126 Patrol Craft Pakistan  Kaan 33 120 18 0 0
127 Patrol Craft Poland  Pilica 93 14 0 0
128 Patrol Craft USA Marine Protector 91 10 0 0
129 Small PC USA Sea Ark 9.3 6 0 0
130 Small PC USA SOCR 9.1 4 0 0
131 Small PC USA PBR MkII 8 4 0 0
132 Small PC USA HSIV 3.4 2 0 0
133 Small PC USA Defender 2.7 4 0 0
134 Submarine USA Virginia SSN 7800 134 0 0
135 Submarine UK Astute SSN 7400 140 0 0
136 Submarine USA LA SSN688 7011 134 0 0
137 Submarine Japan Soryu 4200 65 0 0
138 Submarine Japan Oyashio SS90 3500 70 0 0
139 Submarine Japan Harushio SS583 3200 75 0 0
140 Submarine France Rubis SSN 2670 68 0 0
141 Submarine Russia Lada Project 677 2650 37 0 0
142 Submarine China Song 2250 60 0 0
143 Submarine Turkey Type 214 1860 27 0 0
144 Submarine Germany Type 212A 1830 28 0 0
145 Submarine Spain Agosta 90B 1760 36 0 0
146 Submarine Malaysia Scorpene 1758 31 0 0
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147 Submarine Sweden Sodermanland 1600 27 0 0
148 Submarine Sweden Gotland A17 1599 27 0 0
149 Submarine Greece Type 209 1285 38 0 0
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D. REGRESSION STATISTICS 
Summary Output LHA Regression 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (All Carriers in Sample) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (Without U.S. Carriers) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (All Carriers in Sample) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (Without U.S. Carriers) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (All Carriers in Sample) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (Without U.S. Carriers) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (All Carriers in Sample – Alternate 
Method) 
Summary Output Aircraft Carrier Regression (Without Us Carriers – Alternate Method) 
Summary Output Blue Water Frigates 
Summary Output Light Arsenal Land Attack Vessel 
Summary Output Light Naval Gunfire Support Ship 
Summary Output Air-Independent Propulsion Submarine 
Summary Output Fast Mine Warfare 
Summary Output Offshore Patrol Vessel 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT FOR 149 SHIP REGRESSION 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.9769Observations 149
R Square 0.9543Mean crew 236.7181
Adjusted R Square 0.9540CV 0.4931
Standard Error 116.7241
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 141813910 4.2E+07 3069.02 2.18E-100
Residual 147 2002804 13624.5  
Total 14843816714      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 10.6914 10.3964 1.0284 0.3055
Displacement 0.0319 0.0006 55.3987 2E-100
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT w/o 4 outliers (USN Carriers) 
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.9404 Standard Error 94.9361
R Square 0.8844 Observations 145
Adjusted R Square 0.8836   
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 9862557 9862557 1094.28 7.00E-69 
Residual 143 1288840 9012.87   
Total 144 1.1E+07       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 21.3840 8.9178 2.3979 0.0178 
X Variable 1 0.0290 0.0009 33.0798 7E-69 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT w/o 8 outliers   
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.9703 Standard Error 56.5283
R Square 0.9414 Observations 141
Adjusted R Square 0.9410   
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 7136795 7136795 2233.42 1.6E-87 
Residual 139 444167 3195.45   
Total 140 7580962       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 24.8212 5.3544 4.6356 8.1E-06 
Displacement 0.0290 0.0006 47.2591 1.6E-87 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT LHA REGRESSION 
(LOGARITHMIC TRANSFORMATION) 
NORMALIZED CREW SIZE TO DISPLACEMENT 
SUMMARY OUTPUT (excluding questioned data)  
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.9836  Standard Error 0.0393  
R Square 0.9675  Observations 4  
Adjusted R Square 0.9513     
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.0920 0.0920 59.6116 0.0164
Residual 2 0.0031 0.0015   
Total 3 0.0950       
  Coefficients Std Error t Stat P-value   
Intercept -3.3164 0.0380 -87.2928 0.0001  
ln(Ship) -0.2453 0.0318 -7.7209 0.0164   
      
SUMMARY OUTPUT (including JFS data)   
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.7739  Standard Error 0.1239  
R Square 0.5989  Observations 5  
Adjusted R Square 0.4652     
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.0688 0.0688 4.4788 0.1246
Residual 3 0.0461 0.0154   
Total 4 0.1148       
  Coefficients Std Error t Stat P-value   
Intercept -3.4014 0.1086 -31.3333 0.0001  
ln(#) -0.2063 0.0975 -2.1163 0.1246   
      
SUMMARY OUTPUT (including SMD data)   
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.9845  Standard Error 0.0322  
R Square 0.9692  Observations 5  
Adjusted R Square 0.9590     
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.0979 0.0979 94.5383 0.0023
Residual 3 0.0031 0.0010   
Total 4 0.1010       
  Coefficients Std Error t Stat P-value   
Intercept -3.3145 0.0282 -117.5578 0.0000  
ln(#) -0.2462 0.0253 -9.7231 0.0023   
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(All Carriers in Sample) 
APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF PLANES AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.9397 
R Square 0.8830 
Adjusted R Square 0.8732 





ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 4502.16 4502.16 90.53 6.11E-07
Residual 12 596.77 49.73   
Total 13 5098.93       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 2.2860 3.4630 0.6601 0.5216
Displacement 0.0006 6.2277E-05 9.5148 6.11E-07
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted approx # of planes Residuals Standard Residuals 
1 14.4926 9.5074 1.4032 
2 10.4929 4.5071 0.6652 
3 28.8620 -5.8620 -0.8652 
4 29.4842 -7.4842 -1.1046 
5 24.5068 -12.5068 -1.8459 
6 27.4695 2.5305 0.3735 
7 12.4708 -2.4708 -0.3647 
8 18.3318 1.6682 0.2462 
9 9.0915 2.9085 0.4293 
10 18.3442 1.6558 0.2444 
11 52.0368 -0.0368 -0.0054 
12 56.4969 -4.4969 -0.6637 
13 61.5413 13.4587 1.9864 
14 55.3788 -3.3788 -0.4987 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(Without U.S. Carriers) 
APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF PLANES AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics    
Multiple R 0.5924    
R Square 0.3510    
Adjusted R Square 0.2698    
Standard Error 5.4611    
Observations 10    
Mean 29.9  CV 0.182645
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 129.0112 129.0112 4.3258 0.0711
Residual 8 238.5888 29.8236   
Total 9 367.6       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 10.4752 4.3592 2.4030 0.0430
Displacement 0.0003 0.0001 2.0799 0.0711
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted approx # of planes Residuals Standard Residuals 
1 16.4287 7.5713 1.4705 
2 14.4779 0.5221 0.1014 
3 23.4370 -0.4370 -0.0849 
4 23.7404 -1.7404 -0.3380 
5 21.3128 -9.3128 -1.8087 
6 22.7578 7.2422 1.4066 
7 15.4426 -5.4426 -1.0571 
8 18.3011 1.6989 0.3300 
9 13.7944 -1.7944 -0.3485 




SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(All Carriers in Sample) 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.9517 
R Square 0.9058 
Adjusted R Square 0.8980 
Standard Error 357.5586 
Observations 14 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 14754999.4672 14754999.4672 115.4104 0.0000 
Residual 12 1534177.4614 127848.1218   
Total 13 16289176.93       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -89.4050 175.5862 -0.5092 0.6199
Displacement 0.0339 0.0032 10.7429 0.0000
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Crew Residuals Standard Residuals
1 609.3959 75.6041 0.2201
2 380.4199 201.5801 0.5868
3 1432.0136 -373.0136 -1.0858
4 1467.6321 492.3679 1.4333
5 1182.6841 217.3159 0.6326
6 1352.2960 -96.2960 -0.2803
7 493.6528 61.3472 0.1786
8 829.1790 -586.1790 -1.7063
9 300.1935 154.8065 0.4506
10 829.8914 -301.8914 -0.8788
11 2758.7177 171.2823 0.4986
12 3014.0515 185.9485 0.5413
13 3302.8327 -602.8327 -1.7548
14 2950.0400 399.9600 1.1643
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(Without U.S. Carriers) 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.7947 
R Square 0.6315 
Adjusted R Square 0.5855 
Standard Error 342.8666 
Observations 10 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 1611915.8815 1611915.8815 13.7117 0.0060 
Residual 8 940460.2185 117557.5273   
Total 9 2552376.1       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept -58.2276 273.6873 -0.2128
Displacement 0.0323 0.0087 3.7029
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Crew Residuals Standard Residuals
1 607.2380 77.7620 0.2406
2 389.1849 192.8151 0.5965
3 1390.6137 -331.6137 -1.0258
4 1424.5330 535.4670 1.6565
5 1153.1781 246.8219 0.7635
6 1314.6989 -58.6989 -0.1816
7 497.0162 57.9838 0.1794
8 816.5366 -573.5366 -1.7742
9 312.7856 142.2144 0.4399




SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(All Carriers in Sample) 
AIRCREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.9561 
R Square 0.9141 
Adjusted R Square 0.9056 
Standard Error 314.5701 
Observations 12 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 10535067 10535067 106.4639 0.0000
Residual 10 989543.7 98954.37   
Total 11 11524610       
 
     
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -375.2581 160.7398 -2.3346 0.0417
Displacement 0.0288 0.0028 10.3181 1.19E-06
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted aircrew Residuals Standard Residuals
1 217.4634 148.5366 0.4952
2 23.2464 206.7536 0.6893
3 945.4175 -319.4175 -1.0650
4 847.5897 -237.5897 -0.7921
5 119.2903 81.7097 0.2724
6 403.8829 -231.8829 -0.7731
7 -44.8015 190.8015 0.6362
8 404.4872 -236.4872 -0.7885
9 2040.5136 439.4864 1.4653
10 2257.0871 222.9129 0.7432
11 2502.0307 -542.0307 -1.8072
12 2202.7927 277.2073 0.9242
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(Without U.S. Carriers) 
AIRCREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.8431 
R Square 0.7108 
Adjusted R Square 0.6626 
Standard Error 115.5790 
Observations 8 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 197035.9 197035.9 14.7498 0.0086
Residual 6 80151 13358.5   
Total 7 277186.9       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -23.8954 97.2142 -0.2458 0.8140
Displacement 0.0132 0.0034 3.8406 0.008553
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted aircrew Residuals Standard Residuals
1 247.5135 118.4865 1.1073
2 158.5810 71.4190 0.6674
3 580.8459 45.1541 0.4220
4 536.0502 73.9498 0.6911
5 202.5598 -1.5598 -0.0146
6 332.8756 -160.8756 -1.5034
7 127.4217 18.5783 0.1736
8 333.1523 -165.1523 -1.5434
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(All Carriers in Sample – Alternate Method) 
AIRCREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.8930 
R Square 0.7974 
Adjusted R Square 0.7771 
Standard Error 483.1989 
Observations 12 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 9189798 9189798 39.3599 9.22E-05
Residual 10 2334812 233481.2   
Total 11 11524610       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -425.0655 265.6409 -1.6002 0.1406 
approx # of planes 44.3224 7.0647 6.2737 9.22E-05 
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted aircrew Residuals Standard Residuals
1 638.6711 -272.6711 -0.5918
2 239.7699 -9.7699 -0.0212
3 550.0264 75.9736 0.1649
4 904.6053 -294.6053 -0.6395
5 18.1581 182.8419 0.3969
6 461.3817 -289.3817 -0.6281
7 106.8028 39.1972 0.0851
8 461.3817 -293.3817 -0.6368
9 1879.6972 600.3028 1.3030
10 1879.6972 600.3028 1.3030
11 2899.1115 -939.1115 -2.0384
12 1879.6972 600.3028 1.3030
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIRCRAFT CARRIER REGRESSION 
(Without U.S. Carriers – Alternate Method) 
AIRCREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.7304 
R Square 0.5334 
Adjusted R Square 0.4557 
Standard Error 146.8117 
Observations 8 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 147864.8 147864.8 6.8603 0.039628
Residual 6 129322.1 21553.69   
Total 7 277186.9       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -107.6983 169.4799 -0.6355 0.5486 
approx # of planes 22.0953 8.4359 2.6192 0.039628 
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted aircrew Residuals Standard Residuals
1 422.5898 -56.5898 -0.4163
2 223.7317 6.2683 0.0461
3 378.3991 247.6009 1.8216
4 555.1618 54.8382 0.4035
5 113.2551 87.7449 0.6456
6 334.2084 -162.2084 -1.1934
7 157.4457 -11.4457 -0.0842
8 334.2084 -166.2084 -1.2228
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SUMMARY OUTPUT BLUE WATER FRIGATES 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.7905 
R Square 0.6250 
Adjusted R Square 0.6062 
Standard Error 38.1494 
Observations 22 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 48505.92 48505.92 33.3287 1.2E-05
Residual 20 29107.58 1455.38   
Total 21 77613.50       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 37.6353 20.5365 1.8326 0.0818
Displacement 0.0371 0.0064 5.7731 1.2E-05
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Crew Size Residuals Standard Residuals
1 86.9598 3.0402 0.0817
2 87.7016 37.2984 1.0018
3 89.5559 40.4441 1.0863
4 91.7811 42.2189 1.1340
5 98.8274 -30.8274 -0.8280
6 100.3109 -5.3109 -0.1427
7 105.8738 -47.8738 -1.2859
8 111.8076 -18.8076 -0.5052
9 113.1056 -39.1056 -1.0504
10 131.2778 45.7222 1.2281
11 147.0394 -57.0394 -1.5321
12 156.3110 48.6890 1.3078
13 156.3110 -85.3110 -2.2915
14 161.8739 37.1261 0.9972
15 162.9865 24.0135 0.6450
16 176.7084 -23.7084 -0.6368
17 182.2713 7.7287 0.2076
18 189.6885 10.3115 0.2770
19 193.3971 -12.3971 -0.3330
20 214.5363 -16.5363 -0.4442
21 219.3575 30.6425 0.8231
22 245.3178 9.6822 0.2601
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SUMMARY OUTPUT LIGHT ARSENAL LAND ATTACK VESSEL 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.7748 
R Square 0.6004 
Adjusted R Square 0.5804 
Standard Error 37.881 
Observations 22 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 43114.03 43114.03 30.0448 2.2970E-05
Residual 20 28699.83 1434.99   
Total 21 71813.86       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 19.6330 15.5973 1.2587 0.2226
Displacement 0.04326 0.0079 5.4813 2.3E-05
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Crew Size Residuals Standard Residuals
1 165.8416 21.1584 0.5723
2 164.5439 34.4561 0.9320
3 158.0554 46.9446 1.2699
4 158.0554 -87.0554 -2.3549
5 147.2411 -57.2411 -1.5484
6 128.8569 48.1431 1.3023
7 107.661 -33.661 -0.9105
8 92.7373 2.2627 0.0612
9 80.1928 49.8072 1.3473
10 78.0300 46.9700 1.2705
11 77.1648 12.8352 0.3472
12 106.147 -13.147 -0.3556
13 99.2259 -41.2259 -1.1152
14 91.0071 -23.0071 -0.6223
15 82.7882 51.2118 1.3853
16 75.6508 -11.6508 -0.3152
17 46.4524 -3.4524 -0.0934
18 48.1826 -3.1826 -0.0861
19 41.2615 -9.2615 -0.2505
20 31.4422 -11.4422 -0.3095
21 31.3124 -2.3124 -0.0626
22 29.1496 -17.1496 -0.4639
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SUMMARY OUTPUT LIGHT NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT SHIP 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.8156 
R Square 0.6653 
Adjusted R Square 0.6500 
Standard Error 56.5387 
Observations 24 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 139762.15 139762.15 43.72 1.20E-06
Residual 22 70325.85 3196.63   
Total 23 210088.00       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 51.18552 27.1252 1.8870 0.0724
Displacement 0.028765 0.0044 6.6122 1.2E-06
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Crew Size Residuals Standard Residuals
1 381.6969 94.3031 1.7054
2 337.6000 20.4000 0.3689
3 335.9604 54.0396 0.9773
4 324.0228 -24.0228 -0.4344
5 308.5184 -34.5184 -0.6242
6 265.4858 -74.4858 -1.3470
7 253.9797 -58.9797 -1.0666
8 242.0422 -42.0422 -0.7603
9 246.7885 -136.7885 -2.4738
10 219.5479 -19.5479 -0.3535
11 212.2703 42.7297 0.7727
12 192.1347 57.8653 1.0465
13 188.3952 9.6048 0.1737
14 171.9991 9.0009 0.1628
15 169.1226 30.8774 0.5584
16 163.3696 26.6304 0.4816
17 159.0548 -6.0548 -0.1095
18 148.4117 38.5883 0.6979
19 147.5487 51.4513 0.9305
20 143.2340 61.7660 1.1170
21 143.2340 -72.2340 -1.3063
22 136.0427 -46.0427 -0.8327
23 123.8175 53.1825 0.9618
24 109.7226 -35.7226 -0.6460
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SUMMARY OUTPUT AIR-INDEPENDENT PROPULSION SUBMARINE 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.9661 
R Square 0.9333 
Adjusted R Square 0.9285 
Standard Error 10.7841 
Observations 16 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 22773.2911 22773.2911 195.8215 1.27E-09 
Residual 14 1628.1464 116.2962   
Total 15 24401.4375       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 4.2705 4.9470 0.8633 0.4025
Displacement 0.0177 0.0013 13.9936 1.27E-09
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Crew Size Residuals Standard Residuals
1 27.0560 10.9440 1.0505
2 32.6238 -5.6238 -0.5398
3 32.6415 -5.6415 -0.5415
4 35.4431 -4.4431 -0.4265
5 35.4786 0.5214 0.0500
6 36.7198 -8.7198 -0.8370
7 37.2518 -10.2518 -0.9840
8 44.1672 15.8328 1.5197
9 51.2600 -14.2600 -1.3687
10 51.6146 16.3854 1.5727
11 61.0125 13.9875 1.3426
12 66.3321 3.6679 0.3521
13 78.7444 -13.7444 -1.3192
14 128.5888 5.4112 0.5194
15 135.4865 4.5135 0.4332






SUMMARY OUTPUT FAST MINE WARFARE 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 




Adjusted R Square 0.19587
Standard Error 7.727423
Observations 28
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 452.4246 452.4246 7.576643 0.010636 
Residual 26 1552.54 59.71307   
Total 27 2004.964       
 




Adjusted R Square -0.00857
Standard Error 8.654144
Observations 28
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 57.71472 57.71472 0.770617 0.388067 
Residual 26 1947.25 74.89421   
Total 27 2004.964       
 




Adjusted R Square -0.01183
Standard Error 6.783381
Observations 7
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 42.78585 42.78585 0.929839 0.379192 
Residual 5 230.0713 46.01426   




SUMMARY OUTPUT OFFSHORE PATROL VESSEL 
(LOGARITHMIC TRANSFORMATION) 
CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.834325 
R Square 0.696099 
Adjusted R Square 0.679215 
Standard Error 0.420071 
Observations 20 
 
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 7.275383 7.275383 41.22977 4.81E-06
Residual 18 3.17627 0.176459   
Total 19 10.45165       
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.47717 0.612353 -0.77924 0.445965
Ln(Disp) 0.625105 0.097353 6.421041 4.81E-06
 
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Ln(Crew) Residuals Standard Residuals
1 2.342592 -0.04001 -0.09785
2 2.356182 0.282875 0.691852
3 2.725847 0.046742 0.114321
4 2.850271 -0.21121 -0.51658
5 2.913994 -0.96808 -2.36772
6 2.998841 0.52752 1.290199
7 3.022433 0.02209 0.054027
8 3.18999 -0.09895 -0.242
9 3.191758 0.471804 1.15393
10 3.268125 0.258235 0.631587
11 3.382096 -0.0148 -0.0362
12 3.581163 -0.58543 -1.43184
13 3.607135 0.030451 0.074477
14 3.900482 -0.11629 -0.28443
15 3.967252 0.597096 1.460368
16 4.063174 -0.25651 -0.62737
17 4.102641 -0.0083 -0.02029
18 4.216268 0.165758 0.405409
19 4.222071 0.548614 1.341791
20 4.26252 -0.6516 -1.59368
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F. READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS 
From Military Sealift Command Website: www.msc.navy.mil 





Fast Sealift Ship ALGOL, SS 42 N/A 12 
Fast Sealift Ship ANTARES, SS 42 N/A 12 
Fast Sealift Ship BELLATRIX, SS 42 N/A 12 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship ADM WM. M. CALLAGHAN, GTS 25 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE DECISION, MV 27 10 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE DIAMOND, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE DOMINGO, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE DOUGLAS, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE DUCATO, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE EDMONT, MV 27 9 0 
Lighter Aboard Ship CAPE FAREWELL, SS 31 N/A 0 
Lighter Aboard Ship CAPE FLATTERY, SS 31 N/A 0 
Modular Cargo Delivery System Ship CAPE GIBSON, SS 32 9 0 
Modular Cargo Delivery System Ship CAPE GIRARDEAU, SS 32 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE HENRY, MV 28 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE HORN, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE HUDSON, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE INSCRIPTION, SS 31 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE INTREPID, SS 31 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE ISABEL, SS 31 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE ISLAND, SS 31 9 0 
Modular Cargo Delivery System Ship CAPE JACOB, SS 38 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE KENNEDY, MV 25 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE KNOX, MV 25 9 0 
Heavy Lift Ship CAPE MAY, SS 34 9 0 
Heavy Lift Ship CAPE MOHICAN, SS 36 N/A 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE ORLANDO, MV 25 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE RACE, MV 29 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE RAY, MV 29 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE RISE, MV 29 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE TAYLOR, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE TEXAS, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE TRINITY, MV 27 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE VICTORY, MV 25 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE VINCENT, MV 25 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE WASHINGTON, MV 28 9 0 
Roll-on/Roll-off Ship CAPE WRATH, MV 28 9 0 
Fast Sealift Ship CAPELLA, SS 42 N/A 12 
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Crane Ship CORNHUSKER STATE, SS 32 9 0 
Aviation Maintenance Logistics Ship CURTISS, SS 40 9 0 
Fast Sealift Ship DENEBOLA, SS 42 N/A 12 
Crane Ship FLICKERTAIL STATE, SS 32 9 0 
Crane Ship GEM STATE, SS 37 9 0 
Crane Ship GOPHER STATE, SS 32 9 0 
Crane Ship GRAND CANYON STATE, SS 37 10 0 
Crane Ship KEYSTONE STATE, SS 37 9 0 
Government-owned Tanker PETERSBURG, SS 38 N/A 0 
Fast Sealift Ship POLLUX, SS 42 N/A 12 
Fast Sealift Ship REGULUS, SS 42 N/A 12 
Aviation Maintenance Logistics Ship WRIGHT, SS 41 9 0 




CREW SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.220435 
R Square 0.048592 
Adjusted R Square 0.0319 




ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 2733.945 2733.945 2.911185 0.093411
Residual 57 53529.72 939.1178   
Total 58 56263.66       
 
     
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 19.96346 11.69948 1.706355 0.093386
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